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Like their counterparts in other countries, policymakers in Great Britain
are paying increasing attention to consumer bankruptcy.' The last decade has
been characterized by stable macroeconomic conditions, expanding credit
availability and (in a population where there is a relatively high per capita
rate of home ownership) rising house prices. Aggregate household debt in the
United Kingdom tops the £1 trillion mark and represents around 140% of
aggregate household income.s These factors have prompted increasing con-
cerns about consumer over-indebtedness and form the backdrop to a signifi-
cant rise in the absolute numbers of debtors seeking relief through formal
insolvency proceedings and other less formal means. Judged by our own stan-
dards, we are experiencing a consumer bankruptcy boom.'
'Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Aberdeen (UK).
tGeldards LLP Professor of Corporate and Insolvency Law, Nottingham Law School, Nottingham
Trent University (UK). This article is an abridged version of a paper given at the INSOL Academics'
Group Meeting held at Scottsdale, Arizona, May 2006. Readers interested in a more detailed account of
British consumer bankruptcy law and of the ongoing reform process are invited to access our original
conference paper at http://ssrn.com/abstract=914522. We thank the following from whom we have bene-
fited greatly during the article's preparation: David Brown, Pat Boyden, Irene Hardill, Jason Kilborn, Mike
Norris, Charles Tabb,]ay Westbrook and the participants in the INSOL Academics' Group Meeting. The
usual disclaimers apply. We also acknowledge the support of the British Academy in contributing to
Donna's travel expenses for attending the meeting.
'Great Britain is made up of two jurisdictions or law districts: (i) England and Wales and (ii) Scotland.
See infra Part I.
2As of December 2005, aggregate personal debt in the United Kingdom (Britain and Northern Ireland)
stood at £1,157.5 billion of which £962.5 billion was secured on a dwelling and £192.3 billion was un-
secured. BANK OF ENGLAND, LENDING TO INDIVIDUALS DECEMBER 2005, available at http://www.bank
ofengland.co.uk/statistics/li/2005/dec/index.htm. (last visited Jan. 31, 2007). The high proportion of se-
cured debt reflects how rising house prices have created leverage for home owners to collateralize the
financing of present consumption. According to a recent study carried out by Datamonitor, the United
Kingdom also has the highest levels of unsecured debt in Western Europe. SeeAmy Watts, BritonsHave
Highest Debts in Western Europe, available at http://www.abcmoney.co.uk/news/2720062611.htm (last
visited Jan. 31, 2007).
3por example, in England and Wales the number of individuals entering formal insolvency procedures
(bankruptcy or individual voluntary arrangement) was 24,549 in 1998 growing year on year to 67,584 in
2005 and projected to top 100,000 in 2006. INSOLVENCY SERVICE, INDIVIDUAL INSOLVENCIES IN EN.
GLAND AND WALES, available at http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/otherinformation/statistics/2006ll/ta·
ble2.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007). Per capita filing rates in Britain are historically low compared to
equivalent rates in North America. See JACOB S. ZIEGEL, COMPARATIVE CONSUMER INSOLVENCY RE.
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The policy response to these phenomena has two aspects. The first is an
attempt by government to pursue strategies aimed at preventing consumers
from becoming over-indebted. These strategies emphasize responsible lending,
debt advice and financial education.' The second - the subject matter of this
article - is a series of reforms designed to modernize British bankruptcy law
by aligning the law more closely with the needs of over-indebted consumers
who can no longer meet their obligations. It has long been recognized that the
laws of the two jurisdictions need to be updated to keep step with the rapid
expansion of consumer credit and debt." However, to date, the Debt Ar-
rangement Scheme ("DAS"), a formal debt rescheduling mechanism intro-
duced in Scotland by the Debt Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Act
2002, is the only legal institution introduced primarily to address the
problems of modern consumer debtors." The reforms now being pursued and
implemented amount to a government-driven attempt to "consumerize" Brit-
ish bankruptcy laws in response to the perceived consumer debt "crisis."?
The objective of these reforms is the creation of integrated legal
frameworks of debt management and relief that provide a menu of options
tailored to the needs of debtors whatever their financial circumstances
whilst, as far as practicable, balancing the interests of debtors and creditors."
Underpinning these emerging frameworks is a "can pay, should pay" principle
that will be familiar to an American audience: namely that debtors with
means (whether income, assets or both) should be required to contribute to-
wards paying their debts. The notion that there should be a quid pro quo for
formal debt relief, which in the case of salaried debtors may demand a contri-
bution to the estate from future excess income, is embedded within British
bankruptcy Iaws.? In simple terms, the implication of "can pay, should pay" is
GIMES 109-12, 129-31 (Hart Publishing Ltd. 2003). However, these rates may give a skewed picture
because they do not take into account the numbers of debtors in informal debt management plans in the
private sector for which there are no reliable statistics.
'See DEPT. OF TRADE ANDINDUSTRY, TACKLING OVER-INDEBTEDNESS ANN. REP. 2005, available at
http://www.dti.gov.uklfileslfile18547.pdf(last visited Jan. 31, 2007); FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY,
TOWARDS A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR FINANCIAL CAPABILITY (2003), available at http://www.fsa.
gov.uk/pubs/otherlfinancial_capability.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
'See DEPT. OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE: REPORT OF THE REVIEW
COMMITTEE, 1982, Cmnd. 8558,9-13,72-87 [hereinafter INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE]; DEPT. OF
TRADE AND INDUSTRY, PRODUCTIVITY AND ENTERPRISE: INSOLVENCy-A SECOND CHANCE, 2001,
Cm. 5234, §§ 1.45-1.48.
6See infra Part II.B.
70n the political economy of the reforms, see lain Ramsay, Functionalism and Political Economy in the
Comparative Study of Consumer Insolvency, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 509 (2006).
8The main stakeholders in the reform process are the credit industry, a relatively powerful consumer
lobby, public and private sector debt advisers and insolvency practitioners with government holding the
ring. Id. at 541-49. No stakeholder has predominant influence probably because of our strict rules on
campaign finance.
9The idea that debtors who can afford it should pay something to their creditors may be thought
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payment plans. These can be imposed on debtors (and creditors) via all of the
formal debt relief mechanisms available in British law. Conversely, British
policymakers have come to accept that consumer debtors who have nothing
to offer their creditors should not be denied access to debt relief. Thus, the
flip-side of "can pay, should pay" - that those who cannot pay should not be
required to pay - is now a major focus of policy. The main driver here is the
realization that there is little point in governments and creditors expending
valuable resources attempting to get blood out of a stone. This has prompted
an increased emphasis on streamlined administrative processing of debtors
who "can't pay." Much of the reform effort has therefore concentrated on
improving existing payment plan mechanisms for "can pays" - notably the
individual voluntary arrangement (England and Wales) and the protected
trust deed (Scotland) - and on facilitating access to debt relief for "can't
pays."
In outlining and assessing the emerging legal frameworks of debt manage-
ment and relief, we hope to add to the picture painted of emerging consumer
bankruptcy systems across the globe-? and thereby to contribute to a process
of "cross-systemic learning."?" While much has been done to develop compre-
hensive consumer-oriented systems in Britain, we contend that there are out-
standing issues of scope and suitability which still need to be addressed. The
issue of scope is concerned with gaps and overlaps in coverage. Are the emerg-
ing legal frameworks sufficiently comprehensive to accommodate the needs of
all debtors, whatever the size of their indebtedness, and whatever their pro-
file in terms of available assets and income? Where debtors have a choice of
mechanisms to address their debt problems, how are those choices framed and
mediated to ensure that debtors make an appropriate choice for their circum-
stances? The issue of suitability is concerned with whether the various legal
mechanisms on the menu of available options are individually fit for purpose.
Part I provides a brief account of the constitutional relationship between
Britain's two jurisdictions (England and Wales; Scotland), Part II outlines the
systems in place from the mid-1980s and the various options for debt manage-
ment and/or debt relief that they provide. Part III critiques these systems
from the perspective of the consumer debtor in terms of scope and suitability
and explores the drivers behind the current reform program. Parts IV and V
relatively uncontroversial. However, the introduction in the United States of means-tested access to
Chapter 7 with a view to redirecting ineligibledebtors into Chapter 13 payment plans illustrates that its
implementation in practice can be highly controversial.
lOSee JOHANNA NIEMI-KIESILAINEN ET AL., CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
(Hart Publishing Ltd. 2003); see also Jason J. Kilborn, Out with the N.ew, In with the Old: As Sweden
Aggressively Streamlines Its Consumer Bankruptcy System. Have U.S. Reformers Fallen Off the Learning
Curve?, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 435 (2007).
IlJason J. Kilborn, Continuity, Change and Innovation in Emerging Consumer Bankruptcy Systems:
Belgium and Luxembourg, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L.R. 69, 70 (2006).
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outline and evaluate these reforms, again in terms of scope and suitability.
Part VI concludes. For the convenience of the reader, a glossary of the acro-
nyms and abbreviations that recur frequently in the article is appended.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION
Notwithstanding that Scotland is part of the United Kingdom, it retains
its own legal system. Under the Scotland Act 1998, it once again has its own
Parliament, whose legislative competence is determined by that Act. Part I of
the 1998 Act reserves to the UK Parliament the power to legislate on cer-
tain specified matters but delegates the power to legislate on all other Sect-
tish matters to the Scottish Parliament. This delegation (or "devolution" as
we call it) does not affect the UK Parliament's right to legislate on devolved
matters.'? and indeed it may be more convenient for it to pass legislation than
for the Scottish Parliament to enact separate legislation for Scotland. How-
ever, a convention has evolved whereby the UK Parliament will not gener-
ally legislate on devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish
Parliament. 13
Corporate insolvency law (applicable to companies and limited liability
partnerships) in both jurisdictions is similar and largely reserved to the UK
Parliament. However, what we call "bankruptcy law" (the law applicable to
debtors other than companies and limited liability partnerships including sole
traders, other forms of partnership and consumers) remains distinct and is
devolved to the Scottish Parliament by Part I of the 1998 Act. Nevertheless,
in proposing the current reforms to Scottish bankruptcy law, the Scottish
Executive identified as a key driver the recent reforms to bankruptcy law in
England and Wales. One of the main policy considerations behind the pro-
posed introduction of similar reforms in Scotland has been the need to main-
tain a level playing field between the two jurisdictions.>' An element of
commonality of purpose therefore remains in the bankruptcy field despite
devolution.
12Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46, § 28(7).
"See CHRIS HIMSWORTH & CHRISTINE O'NEILL, SCOTLAND'S CONSTITUTION: LAW & PRACTICE
(Lexis Nexis UK 2003), 195·6.
14S ee SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY REFORM IN SCOTLAND: A MODERN Ar.
PROACH, § 4.4 (2003), available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/1097/0030743.pdf (last
visited Jan. 31, 2007)[hereinafter MODERN ApPROACH]. The emphasis there was on maintaining a level
playing field for business debtors. The same point applies equally well in a consumer context.
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n. THE EXISTING SYSTEMS FOR DEBT MANAGEMENT AND
RELIEF IN BRITAIN
A. ENGLAND AND WALES
1. Ban~ruptcy
Bankruptcy under Part IX of the Insolvency Act 1986 ("lA 1986") is a
judicial procedure for the liquidation of assets of individual debtors. The High
Court or a relevant county court can make a bankruptcy order in prescribed
circumstances on the petition of the debtor or a hostile creditor.V Debtors
filing for bankruptcy must lodge a statement of affairs with the court demon-
strating inability to pay their debts,'> a less onerous threshold than has hith-
erto applied in Scotland.'? All bankruptcies are administered initially by an
official receiver (""the OR"), a state official employed by the Insolvency Ser-
vice, an executive agency of the Department of Trade and Industry.v' A pri-
vate sector trustee may be appointed by the creditors or the Secretary of
State for Trade and Industry to succeed the OR.l9 In practice, this only
happens if the debtor has sufficient assets to make the appointment worth-
while or if there are matters worthy of full investigation and possible chal-
lenge under avoiding powers. A trustee must be a licensed insolvency
practitioner ("IP") authorized to take insolvency appointments under Part
XIII of lA 1986. Most IPs are accountants and are licensed by one of several
recognized professional bodies.'?
Bankruptcy is a debt relief tool taking the form of a statutory composition
designed to balance the interests of debtors and creditors. The debtor surren-
ders non-exempt assets (exempt assets are limited to tools of trade and items
necessary for satisfying basic domestic needs)." In contrast to Chapter 7 of
the US Bankruptcy Code, the debtor may be ordered to make contributions
from any surplus income for up to three years under an income payments
15Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, §§ 264-268, 272, 373-374. The procedure is largely routine in the
majority of debtor-filed petitions.
'6Id. at c. 45, § 272.
17See infra Part nB.
'SIA 1986, c. 45, § 287. There are thirty-nine ORs in England and Wales each attached to a particular
court or courts. For details, see Insolvency Service, http://www.insolvency-service.co.uk/officemap.htm.
For the origins, history and functions of the OR system first established in 1883, see V. MARHAM LES.
TER, VICTORIAN INSOLVENCY: BANKRUPTCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND COMPANY WINDING'Up
IN NINETEENTH,CENTURY ENGLAND, 170-221 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995).
'9IA 1986, c. 45, §§ 292·296.
2°The licensing framework for IPs is set out in lA 1986, c. 45, §§ 388·98.
21IA 1986, c. 45, §§ 283, 307·308A. English law has no homestead exemption. However, the bank-
rupt's interest in a dwelling house automatically ceases to be comprised in the estate three years from the
date of the bankruptcy order. Id. at c. 45, § 283A. This provision was introduced to prevent trustees from
keeping estates open indefinitely in the hope of cashing out the interest at the top of a rising market.
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order or agreement." The debtor also submits to an initial investigation car-
ried out by the OR and must cooperate with the OR and any subsequently
appointed trustee." In return, the debtor obtains discharge of her "bank-
ruptcy debts:" the debts or liabilities to which she was subject at the com-
mencement of bankruptcy.>' The discharge is generous. Bankruptcy debts are
broadly defined and the categories of non-dischargeable debt are strictly
limited.s"
Discharge policy in England and Wales has been further loosened by the
Enterprise Act 2002 ("EA 2002"). Effective 1 April 2004, debtors receive an
automatic discharge no later than one year after the bankruptcy order, a re-
duction from the previous period of three years. 26 Discharge can be obtained
even earlier if, after the initial vetting process, the OR considers that investi-
gation of the debtor's conduct and affairs is unnecessary or concluded and
files a notice with the court to that effect.z7 The policy of the EA 2002 was
to encourage honest but failed entrepreneurs to reengage in risk-taking by
providing a quick, comprehensive discharge and by reducing the stigma at-
taching to bankruptcy through the wholesale reduction of the legal restric-
tions to which undischarged bankrupts were previously subjected on public
interest grounds.s" However, it was not intended that bankruptcy should
become a "soft touch." The income payment provisions were clarified to rein-
force the "can pay, should pay" principle by permitting surplus income to be
captured before and after discharge for up to three years. To increase cost-
22IA 1986, c. 45, §§ 310-31OA. Income payments can only be demanded if they do not reduce the
income of the bankrupt below what appears to be necessary for meeting the reasonable domestic needs of
the bankrupt and her family. In practice, ORs determine what expenses can be deducted in calculating
surplus income under the "reasonable domestic needs" test. INSOLVENCY SERVICE, INSOLVENCY SERVICE
TECHNICAL MANUAL ch. 31.7 (2004), available at http://www.insolvency.gov.uklfreedomofinformation/
technicalltechmanvolI/Ch25-36/Chapter3 I1part7/partl/part1.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007); INSOL·
VENCY SERVICE, CASE HELP MANUAL (2006), available at http://www.insolvency.gov.uklfreedomofin-
formationltechnicallcasehelpmanual (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
23IA 1986, c. 45, §§ 291, 333.
24Id. at c. 45, §§ 281, 382.
25Id. at c. 45, § 281(3)-(8). Non-dischargeable debts include criminal penalties, debts arising from fraud
or fraudulent breach of trust, debts arising under a court order made in family proceedings (such as alimony
or child support payments) and student loans. Id. at c. 45, § 281(5)(b), (8); Higher Education Act 2004, C.
8, §42.
26Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, § 256 (replacing lA 1986, c. 45, former § 279 with current § 279).
27IA 1986, c. 45, § 279(2).
2SSee INSOLVENCY SERVICE, BANKRUPTCY: A FRESH START-A CONSULTATION ON POSSIBLE RE·
FORM TO THE LAW RELATING TO PERSONAL INSOLVENCY IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 19-27 (2000);
DEPT. OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, PRODUCTIVITY ANDENTERPRISE: INSOLVENCy-A SECOND CHANCE,
2001, Cm. 5234, 1-5 [hereinafter SECOND CHANCE]; see also DAVID MILMAN, PERSONAL INSOLVENCY
LAW, REGULATION AND POLICY (Ashgate Publ'g Ltd. 2005); lain Ramsay, Ban~ruptcy in Transition:
The Case of England and Wales in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 10, at
205-26; Adrian Waiters, Personal Insolvency Law After the Enterprise Act: An Appraisal, 5 J. CORP. L.
STUD. 65, 65-8 (2005).
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effectiveness, provision was made for income payments agreements to be
reached between the debtor and the OR/trustee without a court order.s? A
new post-discharge restrictions system was also introduced, modeled on
Great Britain's Company Directors' Disqualification Act 1986, which aims to
penalize dishonest or irresponsible debtors who, by reason of past miscon-
duct, are deemed unworthy of a full "fresh start.">? A debtor subject to post-
discharge restrictions is prohibited from acting in various capacities (such as a
company director or an IP) and from obtaining credit above a prescribed
amount (currently £500) without disclosing the restrictions." Post-discharge
restrictions can be imposed by the court or, where the debtor consents, by
administrative means, ranging from two to fifteen years.'? Post-discharge re-
strictions do not affect discharge.P As conceived, post-discharge restrictions
limit the debtor's ability to re-enter the credit economy, thus confining the
scope of the fresh start to discharge of old debts. They are a matter of public
record that, in theory, should improve the information available to credit
markets and affect credit scoring by enabling lenders to differentiate between
culpable and non-culpable debtors.>'
The extent to which the EA 2002 reforms represent a liberalization of
bankruptcy is contested. On the one hand, it can be argued that the combina-
tion of the income capture and post-discharge restrictions provisions, to-
gether with the public nature of the bankruptcy process.v still make
bankruptcy a "tough" option. On the other hand, some have suggested that
bankrupts now get an "easy ride" to a swift and generous discharge and that
this has contributed to rising numbers of bankruptcies." If this were so, we
might expect to see debtors choosing bankruptcy over other debt solutions in
ever increasing numbers. Yet, while aggregate numbers of formal insolvencies
have certainly increased since EA 2002 came into force, bankruptcy's share of
that increase relative to individual voluntary arrangements - the formal al-
29See SECOND CHANCE, supra note 28, § 1.20; lA 1986, c. 45, §§ 31O·310A.
30See Donna McKenzie Skene, MorallyBan~rupt7 ApportioningBlame in Ban~ruptcy, 48]. Bus. 1. 171,
171·218 (2004); ADRIAN WALTERS & MALCOLM DAVIS,WHITE QC, DIRECTORS' DISQUALIFICATION
AND BANKRUPTCY RESTRICTIONS (Sweet & Maxwell 2d ed. 2005); Waiters, supra note 28, at 85·100.
"lA 1986, c. 45, § 360(5).
32Id. at c. 45, §§ 4(2), 9(2), sched. 4A.
"The only ground for suspending discharge is where the debtor has failed or is failing to comply with
her statutory obligations to the OR and/or to her trustee. See lA 1986, c. 45, § 279(3),(4). There are no
grounds for absolute denial of discharge.
34See Walters, supra note 28, at 99·100, 103.
35The OR is statutorily obliged to advertise bankruptcy orders: Insolvency Rules, 1986, SI 1986/
1925, § 6,46(2).
36See Neil Smyth, Blame the Enterprise Act for Rising Debt, available at http://www.timesonline.co.
uk/artic1e/0,,28009·2187082,00.html (last visited Jan. 31,2007).
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ternative to bankruptcy provided for by lA 1986 - is declining."? One ex-
planation is that IPs, whose business is selling arrangements to salaried
consumer debtors, have no economic stake in recommending bankruptcy."
Despite the business orientation of the reforms, access to bankruptcy is
not restricted to traders. Consumers can avail themselves of bankruptcy re-
lief on the same terms - submission to a preliminary investigation by the
OR, surrender of non-exempt assets and (where appropriate) contributions
from surplus income for up to three years - if they are willing to run the
risk of post-discharge restrictions. For consumers who have limited non-ex-
empt assets and little surplus income, bankruptcy is a rational choice.'? The
same may be true of debtors whose assets are limited but who do possess
surplus income, because income payments in bankruptcy cannot stretch be-
yond three years; whereas, creditors tend to demand five-year payment plans
from consumers who wish to avoid bankruptcy.'? The main barrier to entry
is the cost offiling for bankruptcy. As well as the court fee (currently £150),
the debtor must also pay a deposit of £325 to cover the OR's costs.t'
2. Individual Voluntary Arrangements ("IVAs")
The formal alternative to bankruptcy is an IVA under Part VIII of lA
1986. The origins of the IVA can be traced back to the early nineteenth
century when creditor dissatisfaction with limited returns in bankruptcy first
prompted consideration of statutory alternatives.s- An IVA is a binding con-
sensual arrangement that arises from a proposal made by the debtor to her
creditors. It is an extra-judicial procedure in which the court has only a lim-
ited supervisory role.t ' The proposal, which may encompass assets, income or
both, is formulated by the debtor in conjunction with an IP ("the nomi-
nee").44 The creditors vote on the proposal, and if they approve it, the nomi-
37INSOLVENCY SERVICE, INDIVIDUAL INSOLVENCIES IN ENGLAND AND WALES, available at http://
www.insolvency.gov.uk/otherinformation/statistics/2006111table2.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
3SSee infra Part ILA.2.
39The majority of filings are now consumer filings. Of these, most are "no asset" cases that return
nothing to creditors. SeeMICHAEL GREEN, INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENTS, OVER·INDEBTED.
NESS AND THE INSOLVENCY REGIME, 22 (2002), available at http://www.insolvency.gov.uklinsolvency
professionandlegislation/policychangelivapolicyresearch/shortformreport.doc (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
40See infra Parts ILA.2 and IV.A.2.
4'IA 1986, c. 45, § 415; Insolvency Proceedings (Fees) Order, 2004, 5.1. 2004/593 amended by Insol-
vency Proceedings (Fees)(Amendment) Order, 2006, S.L 2006/251, § 2(2)(b); see also R. v. Lord Chancel-
lor, ex parte Lightfoot, [2000] Q.B. 597. The deposit payable on a debtor's petition will increase to £335
with effect from April 1, 2007. See Insolvency Proceedings (Fees)(Amendment) Order, 2007, 5.1. 2007/
521, § 2(3)(b).
42Lord Eldon's Act, 1825,6 Geo. 4, c. 16; see also LESTER, supra note 18, at 1·39; INSOLVENCY LAW
AND PRACTICE, supra note 5, at 14·35.
43IA 1986, c. 45, §§ 256A(3), 259, 262, 263(3)·(5). Approved IVAs are subject to limited rights of
challenge by dissentient creditors.
44Id. at c. 45, § 256(1)(a).
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nee becomes the supervisor of the IVA responsible for overseeing its
implementation and ensuring that the debtor complies with its terms.t" The
key feature of an IVA is that it binds dissenting creditors.ss If the proposal is
approved by in excess of 75% of the creditors by value.t" all creditors who
were entitled to vote are bound regardless of whether or not they attended
the creditors' meeting or how they voted." IVAs are usually proposed as a
means of avoiding bankruptcy but may also be proposed by undischarged
bankrupts with a view to having their bankruptcy annulled.e?
The terms of an IVA depend on what the creditors will accept. Credi-
tors can demand modifications to the proposal before approving it.50 Debtors
who are salaried homeowners will usually be expected to release at least
some equity while also making income contributions. Debtors who have sur'
plus income but no assets will need to offer sufficient payments to convince
creditors, who often insist on a projected minimum dividend, to approve the
arrangement. IVAs invariably provide for debt composition and discharge on
successful completion and therefore function as a tool of debt relief. Debtors
also avoid the greater publicity and perceived stigma associated with bank,
ruptcy.>' For creditors, IVAs offer better returns than bankruptcy.P How,
ever, it is important that payment terms are set at realistic and affordable
levels because, should the debtor default, she is exposed to a bankruptcy or,
der on the basis of her inability to meet the liabilities contracted under the
IVA,53 The terms can be varied with the unanimous agreement of the credi-
tors should the debtor's circumstances change during the lifetime of the
4'Id. at c. 45, § 263.
46Id. at c. 45, § 260.
"Id. at c. 45, §§ 257·258; Insolvency Rules, 1986, SJ. 1986/1925, § 5.23.
4BIA 1986, c. 45, § 260. An IV A is therefore a contract given statutory force so that it binds dissent-
ing creditors.
49Id. at c. 45, § 261. EA, 2002, c. 40, § 264 also introduced a fast-track IV A procedure administered
by the OR available exclusively to undischarged bankrupts. lA 1986, c. 45, § 263(A)·(G).
50Id. at c. 45, § 258(2)·(5).
5lThough, like bankruptcy, the fact that a debtor has entered an IVA is still a matter of public record
noted on a statutory insolvency register maintained by the Insolvency Service. See Insolvency Rules, 1986,
S.l. 1986/1925, §§ 6A.1·6A.2.
52For historic evidence, see Keith Pond, The Individual Voluntary Arrangement Experience, 39 J.Bus.
L. 118 (1995); Keith Pond, An Insolvent Decade: The ChangingN.ature of the IVA 1987·1997, Loughbor-
ough University Banking Centre Research Paper Series No. 125198 (Oct. 1998), Social Science Research
Network, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.efm?abstract_id:=;139556; see also GREEN,
supra note 39, at 16. In theory, the costs of an IVA should be lower than the costs of bankruptcy as (i)
there are no OR's costs and (ii) the lP's role in administering an approved IVA is less onerous than that of
a trustee in bankruptcy. However, the cost-effectiveness of IVAs has been questioned in cases where debt
levels are relatively low because IV As involve a fixed level of unavoidable cost. See infra Parts III.A. and
IV.A.
"lA 1986, c. 45, § 264(1)(c). The terms of the IVA will usually require the supervisor to file for the
debtor's bankruptcy in the event of default.
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IVA.54
The key intermediary is the IVA nominee and supervisor who must be
an IP.55 As such, IVAs are subject to regulatory, as well as court, oversight.
Nominees are professionally obliged to satisfy themselves that debtors consid-
ering IVAs have received appropriate advice about their available options
(including bankruptcyj." The nominee must also file a report with the court
indicating whether the proposal has a reasonable prospect of being approved
and implernenteds? and notify the court of the outcome of the creditors'
meeting."
IVAs are open to business and consumer debtors. The lP's costs for act'
ing as nominee and supervisor are met from the arrangement proceeds. There
are generally no court fees or deposits to pay upfront. Statistical evidence
suggests that the popularity of IVAs has been increasing since the late' 1990s.
In 1998, roughly 20% of individuals who entered formal insolvency proceed,
ings went into IVAs. The figure for 2006 is over 40%.59 Research con'
ducted by accountancy firm PricewaterhouseCoopers has demonstrated that
consumers are now the principal users of the IVA.60 Their increasing popu,
larity may be attributable to so-called IVA "factories:" firms which aggres,
sively market IVAs as a debt solution through the media and employ IPs to
process debtors.>'
54In reAlpha Lighting Ltd., [1997J B.P.I.R. 341. Provision for variations to be approved by a majority
of creditors is commonly included in the proposal.
55IA 1986, c. 45, §§ 388(2)(c), 389. IVA provision therefore remains a professional monopoly.
56See Assoc. OF BUSINESS RECOVERY PROFESSIONALS, STATEMENT OF INSOLVENCY PRACTICE No.
3 § 3.3 (Eng. & Wales), available at http://www.r3.org.uk/publications/?p=80 (last visited Jan. 31,2007).
The debtor must be provided with a copy of the booklet Is A VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENT RIGHT FOR
ME? and confirm in writing that she has read and understood it. Id. (referring to Assoc. OF BUSINESS
RECOVERY PROFESSIONALS, Is A VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENT RIGHT FOR ME? (rev. ed. Apr.
2004)[hereinafter R3 BOOKLET]).
57IA 1986, c. 45, §§ 256(I)(a), 256A(3)(a).
58 Id. at c. 45, § 259.
59For the most recent figures, see INSOLVENCY SERVICE, STATISTICS RELIEF, INSOLVENCIES IN THE
THIRD QUARTER 2006 (Nov. 3, 2006), available at http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/otherinformation/sta-
tistics/200611lindex.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
60See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LIVING ON TICK:THE 21ST CENTURY DEBTOR (2006), available
at http://www.pwc.com/uk/eng/about/svcs/brs/PwC-IVAReport.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2007) [here-
inafter LIVING ON TICK]. PricewaterhouseCoopers' data derives from approximately 6,500 IVA proposals
made between July and November 2005. Id. The overwhelming majority of debtors in the sample were
consumer debtors. Id. The evidence shows that the typical debtor in an IV A is likely to be someone under
forty of either gender with credit card and personal loan debts of around £40,000, living in rented accom-
modation and earning less than £30,000 per annum. Id.
6lSee, e.g., Debtsolver, http://www.debtsolver.co.uk (last visited Jan 31, 2007); Debt Free Direct,
http://www.debtfreedirect.co.uk/home.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2007); Debt Advice Online, http://
www.debt-advice-online.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2007). The business model of the factories is not that of
a traditional professional services firm. A number of the factories are quoted companies.
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3. County Court Administration Orders ("CCAOs")
CCAOs offer a limited means of dealing with over-indebtedness outside
the bankruptcy system.s- Originally, they were designed to facilitate the re-
covery of small debts while protecting the debtor from creditor harassment
(which, despite the abolition of imprisonment for debt in 1869, included the
possibility of committal for non-payment of judgment debts until 1970).63 To
be eligible, the debtor's total indebtedness must not exceed the current
county court limit of £5,000 and must include at least one judgment debt.v'
Eligible debtors who wish to apply must file a request in the county court for
the district in which they reside or carry on business setting out details of
their assets, income, expenses and debts." A court officer then considers
whether the debtor has sufficient means to pay the debts listed in the request
in full by installments within a reasonable timeframe.s> If the court officer
decides that payment in full by installments over time is feasible, she deter-
mines the amount and frequency of the payments and notifies the debtor and
the creditors listed in the request of the proposed repayment terms.s? Where
no objection is received within a prescribed period, the court officer may
make a CCAO in the terms proposed.v" If, however, the debtor or a creditor
files an objection or the court officer considers that the debtor has insufficient
means to make full payment by installments within a reasonable time, the
matter is referred to a district judge.s?
CCAOs provide the debtor with protection from the creditors specified
in the request and scheduled to the order. No enforcement action can be
taken against the person or property of the debtor in respect of scheduled
debts without the court's permission."? If the debtor fails to make payments
in accordance with the terms of a CCAO, the court may revoke it.?'
CCAOs are essentially a court-based debt management solution designed
to provide relatively small debtors who have some income but limited assets
with respite from enforcement coupled with rescheduling and consolidation
of their debts. To some extent, they are analogous to a debt payment pro-
62County Courts Act, 1984, c. 28, Part VI.
63For historical background and critique, see INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 5, §§ 68-
73, 151-65,276-80. .
64County Courts Act, 1984, c. 28, § 112(1).
65 See Civil Procedure Rules, S.I. 1998/3132, sched. 2 (referring to Order 39 of the County Court
Rules).
66Id.
67Id.
68Id.
69Id.
70County Courts Act, 1984, c. 28, §§ 112(4), 114. There are limited exceptions permitting execution
against goods and distress for rent in controlled circumstances. Id. at §§ 115-16.
71lA 1986, c. 45, § 429.
488 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 80
gramme entered into under the DAS in Scotland.P However, as a matter of
law, CCAOs can also be used to provide some measure of debt relief. A
CCAO "may provide for the payment of the debts of the debtor by install-
ments or otherwise, and either in full or to such extent as appears practicable
to the court under the circumstances of the case."?" Where the amounts re-
ceived under the order are sufficient to cover costs and "to pay each creditor
scheduled to the order to the extent provided by the order," the debtor will
be discharged from the scheduled debts.?" Thus, if the CCAO provides for
payment in part and the debtor complies with its terms, any remaining bal-
ance is discharged.?> A CCAO can therefore operate as a form of statutory
composition in respect of the scheduled debts. 76 Empirical evidence suggests
that CCAOs are used for debt relief as well as debt management though this
is subject to variations in local legal culture."? However, repayment program-
mes under CCAOs have a low completion rate?" with the result that few
debtors are discharged by this method.
4. Debt Management Arrangements ("DMAs")
DMAs are an informal option available to over-indebted consumers inde-
pendent of the bankruptcy system. While debtors can negotiate DMAs
themselves, they commonly arise after the debtor has sought debt advice from
the voluntary sector or a private sector provider.t? Debt management can
only work with debtors who have a regular source of surplus income. The
debts are rescheduled and, where a provider is involved, consolidated into a
single monthly payment which the provider distributes to creditors.s? DMAs
usually provide for repayment in full over time or repayment on the terms of
the DMA until such time as the debtor has sufficient resources to meet the
72See infra Part ILB.3.
7'County Courts Act, 1984, c. 28, § 112(6).
74Id. at c. 28, §117.
75Id. at c. 28, §§ 112(6), 117-
76An express power to make a CCAO with a "composition provision" was inserted as section 112B of
the County Courts Act by the Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990, c. 41, § 13(5). Even though this
power has never been brought into force, it prompts the argument that its enactment would have been
unnecessary had the existing provisions allowed for debt composition. The counter-argument (which we
prefer) is that section 112B merely clarifies the scope of the court's power under section 112(6). We
consider the wording of section 112(6) to be tolerably clear especially when read alongside section 117.
77See ELAINE KEMPSON & SHARON COLLARD, MANAGING MULTIPLE DEBTS-ExPERIENCES OF
COUNTY COURT ADMINISTRATION ORDERS AMONG DEBTORS, CREDITORS AND ADVISORS, DEPT. OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS RESEARCH SERIES No. 1/04 (jul, 2004) ii, 32-36, available at http://
www.dca.gov.uk/research/2004/1_2004.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
78Id.
79See Ramsay, supra note 28, at 214-17.
80 See INSOLVENCY SERVICE, IMPROVING INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENTS, § 24 (2005),
available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file14069.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2007)[hereinafter IMPROVING
IVAs]; see also http://www.payplan.com/debt-management-plans.php (last visited Jan. 31 2007).
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repayments as originally contracted." Costs vary according to the provider.
Some providers pass their costs onto the creditors while others charge the
debtor but spread the cost over the lifetime of the arrangemenr.s-
DMAs may have advantages for some debtors, such as homeowners, as
they can be entered into without assets having to be surrendered.s> How,
ever, compared with the other options described above, they have several
disadvantages. They are non'binding and do not stay individual collection
efforts.84 Unless creditors can be persuaded to waive it, interest will continue
to run on the amount of the principal debts outstanding when the debtor
entered the DMA.85 This contrasts with bankruptcy, IVAs and CCAOs
where debts (and any accrued interest) are frozen on commencement. De'
pending on levels of indebtedness and surplus income, DMAs may need to
run for many years and can therefore become a treadmill. Finally, they are
largely unregulated. Nevertheless, DMAs are popular with debtors, which
may be attributable to high, profile advertising.
B. SCOTLAND
1. Sequestration
The Scottish equivalent of bankruptcy is sequestration under the Bank,
ruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 ("B(S)A 1985"). A sheriff court or the Court of
Session may award sequestration in prescribed circumstances on the petition
of the debtor, a qualified creditors" or a trustee acting under a trust deed for
creditors.s? A debtor may petition for her own sequestration only where she
(i) has the concurrence of a qualified creditor'" or (ii) satisfies a number of
other requirementsj'? including a requirement that she is either apparently
81See IMPROVING IVAs, § 24.
82To illustrate, say that Debtor needs to pay £200 per month for five years to payoff her debts and
the DMA provider's costs are 10% of the total repayments (£1,200). If the creditors bear the cost (as is
the case with DMAs offered by the Consumer Credit Counselling Service, a charity funded by the credit
industry), the provider will distribute the proceeds to creditors net of the 10% but this will be treated as
payment in full. See Consumer Credit Counselling Service, http://www.cccs.co.uk (last visited Jan. 31,
2007). If Debtor is required to pay the costs, the repayment term would need to be extended by a further
six months to cover the costs and return one hundred pence in the pound to creditors.
83See http://www.payplan.com/frequently.asked.questions/debt-management'plans.php#HomeRisk
(last visited Jan. 31,2007).
84See http://www.payplan.com/frequently-asked-questions/debt-management-plans.php#Disadvan-
tages (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
ssSee http://www.paypJan.com/frequently-asked-quescions/debt-management-plans.phpsf'rozen
Charges (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
s6A qualified creditor is a creditor owed at least £1,500. B(S)A, 1985, c. 66, § 5(4). The Bankruptcy
and Diligence etc (Scotland) Act, 2007, asp. 3, § 25 increases this sum to £3,000.
87B(S)A, 1985, c. 66, §§ 5(2), 9.
sSId. at c. 66, § 5(2).
89Id. at c. 66, § 5(2), (2B).
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insolvents? or has granted a trust deed for creditors which has not become
protected.?' In practice, obtaining the concurrence of a qualified creditor is
rare, and most debtors wishing to petition for sequestration are therefore
forced to meet the alternative requirements for a debtor petition.v- Many
debtors cannot do so, however, because they cannot demonstrate apparent
insolvency and have not granted a trust deed which has failed to become
protected.v' The eligibility requirements are therefore significantly more on'
erous for sequestration than for bankruptcy.
All sequestrations are administered initially by an interim trustee ap'
pointed by the court who may be either an IP or the Accountant in Bank,
ruptcy ("AIB"), a public official employed by the Scottish Executive agency
of the same name, who has functions in relation to non-corporate insolvencies
that are similar in some respects to those of the OR in England and Wales.?!
The interim trustee is then succeeded by a permanent trustee, elected by the
creditors or appointed by the court, who again may be either an IP or the
AIB.95 As in England and Wales, an IP will usually only accept appointment
if there are sufficient assets in the estate to make it worthwhile.
Sequestration, like bankruptcy, is a debt relief tool. The debtor surrenders
her non-exempt assets?" and may also be ordered to contribute from income
up to the date of discharge.v? The debtor's affairs are subject to investiga-
90This concept, analogous to the concept of "acts of bankruptcy," was introduced by B(S)A, 1985,
which lists the means by which a debtor may become apparently insolvent. B(S)A), 1985, c. 66, § 7.
Critically, debtors cannot rely on their own actions or simple inability to pay debts in order to establish
apparent insolvency.
9 1Id at c. 66, § 5(2B)(c)(ii).
920n the reluctance of creditors to concur in a debtor petition, see SCOTTISH OFFICE, ApPARENT
INSOLVENCY, A CONSULTATION PAPER ON AMENDING THE BANKRUPTCY (SCOTLAND) ACT 1985 (Iul.
1997), § 10.
93See MODERN APPROACH, supra note 14, §§ 7.1, 7.8.
94See http://www.aib.gov.ukl. The AIB has certain supervisory and record-keeping functions in rela-
tion to non-corporate insolvency in Scotland and may also administer sequestrations; in relation to corpo-
rate insolvency, the AIB has certain record-keeping functions only. The proposed reforms, if enacted,
would extend the role of the AIB in relation to non-corporate insolvencies in several important respects.
See infra Part IY.B. For the year to 31 March 2006, the latest for which figures are available, the AIB was
appointed interim trustee in 87% of sequestrations. 2005-2006 ACCOUNTANT IN BANKR. ANN. REP. 24.
95B(S)A, 1985, c. 66, §§ 2-3, 18-27-
96B(S)A, 1985, c. 66, §§ 31(1),32(6), 33(1)(a), (aa). The list of exempt assets includes items reasonably
required to meet the basic domestic needs of the debtor and her family as well as tools of trade including a
car (subject to a prescribed limit, currently £1,000). Id.; see also Donna McKenzie Skene, Whose Estate Is
It Anyway? 'The Debtor's Estate On Sequestration, 2005 JURIDICAL REVIEW 311. There is no homestead
exemption in Scots law although the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Act, 2007 introduces an
automatic revesting provision similar to that applicable in England and Wales. See supra note 21.
97B(S)A, 1985, c. 66, § 32(2), (2A), (3). Payments may be ordered where income exceeds that which
the court considers suitable for the debtor's own aliment and any "relevant obligations" i.e., aliment, peri-
odical allowance and child support. Id. The threshold amount allowed for the debtor's own needs must not
be less than the total of any income she receives by way of guaranteed minimum pension in respect of the
debtor's protected rights as a member of a pension scheme. Id. In deciding the allowance for "relevant
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tion.?" and she is obliged to cooperate fully in the sequestration even after
discharge.v? In return, the debtor obtains a discharge of all debts and obliga-
tions for which she was liable at the date of sequestration, subject to limited
exceptions only.100 At present, unless discharge is deferred by the court on
cause shown, a debtor is discharged automatically three years after the date
of sequestration.'?' Alternatively, the debtor may obtain a discharge at any
time after the date of sequestration if an offer of composition is accepted.l?"
This occurs only rarely in practice. 103
Reform of sequestration along parallel lines to the EA 2002 reform of
bankruptcy is part of the reforms contained in the Bankruptcy and Diligence
etc (Scotland) Act 2007. 10 4
2. 'Trust Deeds for Creditors
The main alternative to sequestration is a trust deed for creditors. This is
functionally equivalent to an IVA, albeit structured differently. A trust deed
is a voluntary deed granted by a debtor, which conveys assets and usually
income to a trustee to be administered for the benefit of creditors. At com-
mon law, creditors who do not accede (agree) to a trust deed are not bound
by it, but a trust deed which satisfies certain conditions may be converted
into a protected trust deed ("PTD") if the trustee follows the procedure in
the B(S)A 1985 and a defined percentage of creditors do not object.l'" PTDs
bind all creditors and can only be challenged on limited grounds.t'> Trust
deeds which do not become protected are rare.l?? and this article therefore
concentrates on PTDs.
A PTD must convey to an IP as trustee-vs the debtor's estate excluding
obligations" the court is not bound by any prior court order or agreement fixing the amount of any aliment
or periodical allowance. Id. Beyond these limited provisions, there is no guidance on how the debtor's
allowance is to be calculated. In practice, the amount of any contribution is often agreed to by the debtor
and the trustee without an application to court.
9SB(S)A, 1985, c. 66, §§ 2(4), 3(1).
991d. at c. 66, §§ 64(1), 55(2)(e) (general obligation to cooperate with the permanent trustee).
lO0ld. at c. 66, §§ 54, 55. The main exceptions are: fines or other penalties payable to the Crown; bail;
liability for fraud or breach of trust; aliment or periodical allowance which could not be claimed in seques-
tration; child support maintenance prior to the date of sequestration; and liability for certain student loans.
Id.
WIld. at c. 66, § 54(1).
lO2ld. at c. 66, § 56, sched. 4.
lO3The debtor must promise to pay at least 25p in the pound and the procedure is cumbersome. Id.
The procedure will be streamlined by the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Act, 2007, asp. 3, § 2l.
lO4See infra Part IY.B.
lO5B(S)A, 1985, c. 66, §§ 6, 7, sched. 5.
lO6ld.
lO7See SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE, PROTECTED TRUST DEEDS: CONSULTATION ON DRAFT REGULATIONS
§ 2.7 (2006), available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2006/0l/20093732/0 (last visited
Jan. 31, 2007)[hereinafter PROTECTED TRUST DEEDS).
lOSB(S)A, 1985, c. 66, § 5(1)(a), sched. 5.
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property that would not have vested in a trustee in sequestration under
B(S)A 1985.109 It will generally provide for the debtor to make appropriate
contributions from income, 110 and in practice many PTDs are income-only
because the debtor has no non-exempt assets. In order for the trust deed to
become protected, the trustee must publish a notice in prescribed form and
then send a copy of the trust deed, the notice and certain other information
to all known creditors.ll 1 Unless a majority in number or at least a third in
value of the creditors notifies the trustee in writing within five weeks that
they object to the trust deed, it will become protected on completion of the
remaining forrnalities.t'? Unlike IVAs, the approval procedure is therefore
negative rather than positive, and this has prompted concern that trust deeds
may often become protected through creditor inertia.t-> PTDs do not auto;
matically grant debt relief but, in practice, generally provide for discharge
after three years, the same period as would normally apply in
sequestration.l-"
A PTD is essentially an informal sequestration without all of sequestra;
tion's consequences for the debtor. The debtor generally obtains debt relief
and the creditors usually receive better returns than they would have on
sequestration.t-" A PTD will generally provide for variation of any income
contributions on a change in the debtor's circumstances, but any default by
the debtor may allow the trustee to petition for the debtor's sequestration.v'>
PTDs are private and are not supervised by the court, although the AlE
has a limited supervisory role. Like the nominee/supervisor of an IVA, the
key intermediary is the trustee who as an IP is subject to specific regulatory
guidance in relation to PTDs.117
PTDs may be entered into as a means of avoiding sequestration. They
may also be entered into because the debtor wishes to obtain debt relief but
109§§ 73(1), 5(4A). The PTD estate is not identical to the sequestration estate because certain assets
are excluded from sequestration by provisions other than § 33(1). Id.
lloWhile this is not a requirement for a trust deed to become a PTD, it is unlikely that a trust deed
would become a PTD without such a provision, as creditors would be likely to object to the deed and thus
prevent it from becoming a PTD.
lllB(S)A, 1985, c. 66, § 5(1)(b), (c), sched. 5.
ll2Id. at c. 66, § 5(1)(d), (e), sched. 5.
113See PROTECTED TRUST DEEDS, supra note 107, § 4.26. There was a comparable negative
approval procedure in the US Bankruptcy Act of 1841. SeeCharles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution
of the Ban~ruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.]. 325, 351-52 (1991).
"'See PROTECTED TRUST DEEDS, supra note 107, § 4.25.
115Id. at §§ 3.1-3.2, 3.8-3.9.
116B(S)A, 1985, c. 66, §§ 5(2), (2C). Moreover, the trustee may petition for the debtor's sequestration
at any time if it is in the best interests of the creditors that an award of sequestration be made. Id. at c. 66,
§ 5(2)(b).
117See Assoc. OF BUSINESS RECOVERY PROFESSIONALS, STATEMENT OF INSOLVENCY PRACTICE No.
3A (SCOTLAND), available at http://www.r3.org.uk/publicationslindex.cfm?p=80&s=0&startrow=21
(last visited Jan. 31,2007).
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cannot fulfill the eligibility requirements for sequestration. Like sequestra-
tion, PTDs are open to business and consumer debtors.v'" The costs are gen-
erally met from the trust estate.t-? Like IVAs, the popularity of PTDs is
increasing and it is believed that consumer debtors are now the principal
users.P?
3. Debt Arrangement Scheme
Introduced by the Debt Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Act,
2002 as an alternative mechanism for dealing with over-indebtedness.P! the
DAS came into force on 30 November 2004. 122 It allows individual business
or consumer debtors with multiple debts to enter into a debt payment pro-
gramme ("'DPP") during which there is a stay on enforcement.P> There are
no monetary or time limits.
The debtor must receive money advice before applying for a DPP. The
application is made by a certified money adviser on behalf of the debtor to
the DAS administrator (currently the AIB)P4 In principle, all creditors
whose debts are included in a DPP must consent to it. 12 5 Where this consent
is forthcoming, the application is automatically approved.P" However, the
DAS administrator may dispense with the consent of non-consenting credi-
tors within certain limits'>? and approve the application if it is "fair and rea-
11SB(S)A, 1985, c. 66, § 5(4A) which simply refers to a trust deed being granted by "a debtor".
119Ultimately,payment of costs depends on the terms of the deed though, in practice, PTDs invariably
provide for costs to be met from the estate. This is recognized by B(S)A, 1985, c. 66, sched. 5, § 1 which
makes provision for the auditing of trust accounts and the fixing of the trustee's remuneration. One of the
main concerns raised by the Scottish Executive was the impact of costs on returns to creditors. PRO·
TECTED TRUST DEEDS, supra note 107, §§ 4.28-4.34.
120See ENTERPRISE AND CULTURE COMMITTEE, STAGE 1 REPORT ON THE BANKRUPTCY AND DILI·
GENCE ETC. (SCOTLAND) BILL VOL. 1, § 27 (May 17, 2006), available at http://www.scottish.parliament.
uk/business/committees/enterprise/reports-no/ecr06·07·VolOl-Ou.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007)[herein-
after ECC STAGE 1 REPORT]. In 2001·2005, there were more PTDs than sequestrations and the rate
of growth in the number of PTDs was also greater. The apparent insolvency requirement in sequestration
appears to be the key explanatory variable. The issue of debtor access to sequestration is discussed further
in Parts IY.B and V.B.
121policy Memorandum, Debt Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Bill, SP Bill 52-PM, §§ 12,
15.
122Debt Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Act, 2002, (Commencement No. 2 and Revocation)
Order, 2004, S.S.I. 2004/416, § 2.
123The Debt Arrangement Scheme (Scotland) Regulations, 2004, S.S.I. 2004/468, Part 5. Debts are
defined widely but exclude secured debts with the exception of arrears. Id. § 3.
124Id. § 20.
125Id. § 22(1). Any creditor who does not respond to the request to consent within the prescribed
period is deemed to consent. Id. § 22(3).
126Id. § 25(1).
127Id. § 22(4)(including where (i) the amount due to the creditor is 50% or less of the total debt
included in the DPP and (ii) the amount due to all creditors who refuse to consent does not exceed 60% of
the total debt included in the DPP).
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sonable."128 Where there are non-consenting creditors with whose consent
the DAS administrator cannot dispense, or where a creditor objects on speci-
fied grounds.Pv the DAS administrator must refer the application to the sher-
iff, who will approve it if it is fair and reasonable.P? All DPPs are subject to
standard conditions'>' and may be made subject to a number of additional
discretionary conditions.P? A DPP will generally provide for the debtor to
make a single periodic payment from surplus income.P? The payment is made
'to an approved payments distributor who distributes it to the creditors in-
cluded in the DPP in accordance with its terms.P'' The functions of the
approved payments distributor are carried out by a commercial provider who
is wholly distinct from the money adviser and the DAS administrator.P> The
debtor is restricted from taking on new credit- " and prevented from granting
a trust deed.P? but not from petitioning for sequestration subject to the eligi-
bility requirements. A DPP may be varied on the application of the debtor or
a creditor->" and revoked in defined circumstances including default by the
debtor.'>?
The DAS is primarily an income-based debt management too!' It is possi-
ble to include assets.t '? but in practice, many debtors will have no assets or
128Id. § 26(1).
129Id. § 23(1)(stating that the debtor should be sequestrated or is in possession of heritable property
with substantial unsecured value).
130Id. § 27. In determining whether a DPP is fair and reasonable, the DAS administrator or sheriff
must have regard to various matters including: the total indebtedness; the period of the DPP; the method
and frequency of payments; any earlier proposed DPP that was not approved; the extent of creditor
consent or objection; any comments by the money adviser; and any assets that could have been realized to
pay the debts included in the DPP. Id. §§ 26(2)-(3), 27(3).
l3lId. § 29(1)-(2). These standard conditions are: (i) all payments under the DPP must be made on
time; (ii) continuing liabilities must be paid on time; (iii) no other payments may be made to creditors
taking part in the DPP; (iv) no new credit may be obtained other than in prescribed circumstances;(v) the
debtor's money adviser must be notified of any change of address or material change of circumstances; (vi)
information must be supplied to the debtor's money adviser on request; (vii) all payments for credit ob-
tained in prescribed circumstances must be made on time; and (viii) all required notices and intimations
must be made on time. Id.
l32Id. § 30(1)-(2). These discretionary conditions are: (i) realization of a non-exempt asset and distri-
bution of its value amongst the creditors; (ii) wage garnishment; (iii) seeking agreement from a creditor to
pay a continuing liability via the payments distributor; (iv) completion and return of any tax or duty
return or declaration; (v) maintaining an emergency fund as prescribed or any other reasonable condition.
Id.
l33Id. § 29.
134Id. § 15(b).
135Id. §§ 11, 15.
136Id. § 35.
137Id. § 36.
138Id. §§ 37-39.
139Id. §§ 41-44.
14°Id. § 30. The existence of heritable property with substantial unsecured value is a ground for a
creditor objecting to a DPP. Id. § 23(I)(b). Moreover, the existence of an asset that could have been
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will choose the DAS precisely because they wish to manage their debts with-
out realizing their assets. There is no provision for automatic debt relief. Indi-
vidual creditors may agree to waive interest on or compound their debts.v'!
but agreements of this kind are rare.
4. Voluntary Arrangements
Voluntary arrangements are a further, more informal, response to over-
indebtedness. Not to be confused with IVAs, these are the Scottish
equivalent of DMAs. Debtors may negotiate such arrangements themselves
or they may arise after a debtor has sought advice from money advice organi-
zations such as Citizens Advice Bureau.w-
Voluntary arrangements are debt management tools that typically in-
volve income payments and exclude assets. They generally provide for full
repayment over time, although creditors may waive accruing interest and
charges and/or agree to an element of composition at the outset or after the
arrangement has been operating for a period of time.':" Their disadvantages
are similar to those of DMAs. The DAS was intended to provide a better
alternative for debtors, but this has not been borne out in practice as take-up
under the scheme has been low.144
Ill. THE EXISTING SYSTEMS: SCOPE AND SUITABILITY
A. ENGLAND AND WALES
1. Scope
In practice, the existing system makes no provision for what are termed
"no income, no assets" ("'NINA") debtors who have no meaningful resources
to contribute to creditors. NINA debtors cannot make arrangements with
their creditors through an IVA, CCAO or DMA; all of these require stable
and consistent levels of surplus income if payments are to be sustained. One
danger is that these debtors may opt for payment plans that they simply
realized to pay the debts included in the DPP is one factor which the DAS administrator or sheriff may
take into account in determining whether it is fair and reasonable to approve a DPP. Id. §§ 26-27. It may
be made a discretionary condition of a DPP that the debtor realizes a non-exempt asset and distributes its
proceeds to creditors. Id. § 30. Exempt assets in this context are a house or mobile home which is the
debtor's sole or main residence and articles exempt from the diligence of attachment under the Debt
Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland)Act, 2002. Id. § 30(3).
141Id. § 24.
142Consumer debt is currently the biggest single issue brought to Citizens Advice Bureau in Scotland.
See CITIZENS ADVICE BUREAU, ON THE CARDS: THE DEBT CRISIS FACING SCOTTISH CAB CLIENTS
(2004), available at http://www.cas.org.uk/onthecards.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
14'For a full account of how voluntary arrangements work in practice, see SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE,
ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL OBLIGATIONS IN SCOTLAND, §§ 4.120-4.130 (2002), available at http://www.
scottishexecutive.gov.uk/Publications/2002/04/14590/3531 (last visited Jan. 31,2007)
1H See infra Part IY.B.6.
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cannot afford 145 and/or that are unrealistically short in timescale. NINAs
may also be denied access to bankruptcy relief because they cannot afford to
pay the mandatory OR's deposit.146 The risk is that our poorest debtors -
including the unemployed and other welfare recipients - will be left at the
mercy of their creditors.P? Moreover, many NINAs will not have had access
to mainstream credit. Their creditors may be "sub-prime" lenders that employ
more aggressive and intensive collection techniques than mainstream provid-
ers. The absence of effective access to bankruptcy therefore leaves vulnerable
debtors exposed to harassment even where there is no realistic prospect of
repayment.
As well as the gap in provision for NINAs, there are significant overlaps
in provisions. Salaried debtors whose indebtedness exceeds £5,000 can (in
theory) choose between debt relief (bankruptcy or IVA) and debt manage'
ment (DMA).148 Those whose indebtedness is less than £5,000, but includes
a judgment debt, could also seek a CCAO.149 This complexity raises the
concern that debtors will not necessarily make the best choice for their cir-
cumstances. Furthermore, the available provisions for salaried debtors are not
joined up. A range of public, private and voluntary intermediaries are in'
volved in delivery.P? This reinforces regulatory concerns surrounding the
1455ee KEMPSON & COLLARD, supra note 77, at v, 45-46 (suggesting that most CCAO debtors can
only afford to make token payments, which may go towards explaining the low completion rates); see also
DEPT. OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, A CHOICE OF PATHS-BETTER OPTIONS TO MANAGE OVER-
INDEBTEDNESS AND MULTIPLE DEBT, CP 23/04, §§ 28, 30 (2004), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/
consult/debt/debt.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007)[hereinafter CHOICE OF PATHS]; INSOLVENCY SERVICE,
RELIEF FOR THE INDEBTED-AN ALTERNATIVE TO BANKRUPTCY?, §§ 27-31 (2005), available at http://
www.insolvency.gov.uklinsolvencyprofessionandlegislationlcon_doeregister1consultationpaperwith
newannexl.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2007)[hereinafter RELIEF FOR THE INDEBTED].
1465ee CHOICE OF PATHS,supra note 145, § 32. The government insists that the deposit is necessary
in order to meet the OR's administrative costs. DEPT. OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, RESPONSE PAFER
ON THE CONSULTATlON-'A CHOICE OF PATHS'-BETTER OPTIONS TO MANAGE OVER-INDEBTED.
NESS AND MULTIPLE DEBT CP(R) 23/04, 8-9 (2005), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/debt/
responses.pdf(last visited Jan. 31,2007). Waiver of the deposit would mean that the cross-subsidizing of
"no asset" cases by cases in which there are assets would have to increase significantly to enable the
system to remain self-financing. Creditors of debtors with non-exempt assets would pick up the tab. De-
spite a long campaign by the voluntary money advice sector, the Court of Appeal held that levying the
deposit does not infringe the due process rights of debtors without means to pay it on the analysis that
bankruptcy relief is a "paid for" service or benefit not a constitutional right. R. v. Lord Chancellor, ex parte
Lightfoot, [2000] Q.B. 597 (a British re-run of United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973))
147Based on survey evidence, the government estimates that over 30% of debtors who seek face-to-face
advice at Citizens Advice Bureau are NINAs. RELIEF FOR THE INDEBTED, supra note 145, §§ 23-26.
1485ee supra Part II.A.1, 2, 4.
1495ee supra Part ILA.3.
150 Ramsay, supra note 28, at 214-18. For the point that complexity of provision increases the depen-
dency of consumer debtors on intermediaries and may lead to their effective disempowerment, see lain
Ramsay, Models of Consumer Ban~ruptcy: Implications for Research and Policy, 20]. CONSUMER POL'y
269, 277 (1997)[hereinafter Models of ConsumerBan~ruptcy].
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capacity of the system to deliver independent, impartial and appropriate debt
advice.
One issue is whether bankruptcy and IVAs are sufficiently differentiated.
If we leave aside psychological variables associated with perceived stigma,
debtors who have surplus income but no non-exempt assets and little risk of
attracting post-discharge restrictions are better off going bankrupt than opt-
ing for an IVA on a crude cost-benefit analysis. This is because the maximum
period for which they can be required to contribute from surplus income in
bankruptcy is three years compared to the now industry-standard five years
in an IVA.15l Yet, the IVA market continues to grow fast, raising regulatory
concerns about the quality of advice and information debtors are receiving
about the relative merits of five-year IVAs and bankruptcy from providers
whose business is selling IVAs. The availability of debt relief and debt man-
agement in a complex system raises similar concerns.
2. Suitability
There are suitability issues surrounding the utility of IVAs and CCAOs
for consumer debtors with surplus income. IVAs were originally designed as
a bankruptcy alternative for debtors from business and the profesaions.P>
Despite their continuing popularity, it is arguable that they have been under-
utilized in comparison to DMAs even though they offer consumer debtors
the prospect of debt relief and creditors the prospect of better returns than
bankruptcy at limited cost to the state.15 3 The procedural requirements (in-
cluding the requirement for the holding of a creditors' meeting at which cred-
itors can suggest and vote on modifications to the proposal) generate a fixed
level of unavoidable cost that is incurred regardless of the size of the overall
indebtedness.t>' Thus, IVAs proposed by consumer debtors with small debt
burdens tend to be rejected because the projected returns net of fixed costs
do not satisfy creditors' dividend demands.P" There is a strong case for sim-
plifying the IVA to make it accessible to consumer debtors at a lower thresh-
old of indebtedness.
CCAOs are of limited use. Consumer debtors rarely satisfy the eligibility
criteria. They may have defaults but no judgment debts. Many will owe
more than £5,000. 156 The procedure is a limited payment plan scheme for
15 1See Walters, supra note 28, at 80·81, 102·03.
152INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 5, § 365.
'53It is estimated that 59% of debtors who entered a debt resolution process in 2004 opted for a
DMA compared to 9% who opted for an IV A. IMPROVING IVAs, supranote 80, § 24; GREEN, supra
note 39, Part III (characterizing this as a market and a regulatory failure).
154See IMPROVING IVAs, supranote 80, §§ 26·37.
155See LIVING ON TICK, supra note 60, at 12.
156Id. (showing that British consumers, on average, incur high debt burdens (c. £40,000) before seeking
advice and formal solutions).
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small debtors whose viability is questionable in cost-benefit terms.P?
DMAs are prima facie suitable for debtors who have stable incomes, as-
sets that they wish to preserve and relatively low levels of debt that they
wish to repay over an extended period of time. However, the availability of
debt relief for this type of debtor through a five-year IVA does call into
question the appropriateness of DMAs for anyone other than the "terminally
proud."158
B. SCOTLAND
1. Scope
There are also gaps and overlaps in the Scottish system. Mirroring En-
gland and Wales, the main gap in Scottish provision is the lack of solution for
NINA debtorst-? giving rise to a corresponding risk that they will simply be
left at the mercy of their creditors. In Scotland, it is the eligibility require-
ments rather than the cost of applying for sequestration which is the issue for
these debtors.ts? NINAs, who by definition lack the means to enter a PTD
or the DAS, effectively have no access to an appropriate procedure if they
cannot establish apparent insolvency. The Scottish Executive set up a Work-
ing Group on Debt Relief to consider the NINA question.w' The Working
Group agreed that there was a pool of NINA debtors, although it was not
possible to quantify the number with any accuracy from the information
available.ts- It acknowledged the pressure which NINAs may feel, as a result
of formal or informal enforcement action or otherwise, as a result of their
inability either to pay their debts or obtain debt relief.163
In terms of overlaps, as in England and Wales, a given debtor, particularly
one with disposable income, may in theory choose between different debt
relief/management options. Where the choice is between sequestration (as-
suming eligibility) and a PTD, which capture essentially the same assets and
contributions from income and generally result in debt relief after the same
period of time, debtors may regard a PTD as a better option because it is less
formal and has less severe consequences than sequestration in terms of public-
157The CCAO scheme does not cover its costs and is therefore subsidized by other court users and
taxpayers.
158Pat Boyden, Individual VoluntaryArrangement, RECOVERY, Spring 2004, at 18, available at http://
www.r3.org.uk/uploaded_documents/spring2004.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
159NINA debtors are now referred to in Scotland as LILA (low income, low asset) debtors.
160Thecurrent fee for a sequestration petition is £63. The Sheriff Court Fees Order, 1997, S.I. 19971
687 (S. 47), § 3, sched. 1, amended by Sheriff Court Fees Amendment Order, 2002, S.S.I.2002/269, § 2(3).
161See MODERN ApPROACH, supra note 14, §§ 7.9, 7.10; SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE, REPORT OF THE
WORKING GROUP ON DEBT RELIEF (2005), available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/
1097/0016112.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2007)[hereinafter WORKING GROUP REPORT].
162Id. at 3, 16-20.
163Id. at 22-24; see infra Part IV.B.3 for further discussion of the Working Group's recommendations.
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ity and legal restrictions. Debtors with surplus income may also consider the
DAS. Here, debtor choice may be influenced by a number of factors. One is
the extent of any assets. Both sequestration and a PTD include the debtor's
non-exempt assets while the DAS generally does not. So, a debtor with assets
which would be captured by sequestration or a PTD who does not wish to
lose them may prefer the DAS.164 Another is the availability of debt relief.
Sequestration and a PTD generally result in debt relief while the DAS does
not. A third is the repayment period. This is likely to be longer in DAS than
in sequestration or a PTD because of the requirement to pay in full. Against
this, the DAS may have less severe consequences for the debtor, particularly
in terms of future access to credit.v" A debtor with surplus income may also
consider a voluntary arrangement. The DAS, however, will generally be a
better choice because it is regulated and dissenting creditors can be crammed
down.
The issues of debtor choice resulting from these overlaps are similar to
those in England and Wales although, even with the introduction of the
DAS, the Scottish system is probably less complex. These issues are explored
further below in the discussion of the Scottish reforms. 166
2. Suitability
There are also a number of issues with respect to the suitability of the
various options. The Scottish Executive presented reform of personal insol-
vency law as necessary to produce "a common sense bankruptcy regime suita-
ble for the twenty-first century."167 The system was seen as outdated and in
need of reform in order to be fit for purpose despite having been the subject
of major reform in 1985 and 1993. 168
Sequestration was criticized as unfit for purpose in several ways. It was
seen as stigmatic and inhibiting to enterprise. Reform was seen as necessary
to reduce stigma and encourage entrepreneurship while still providing robust
protection for the public and business community from culpable debtors->?
and ensuring a level playing field with England and Wales following the
changes brought in by EA 2002. 170 It was seen as unfit for purpose as regards
the balance between debtors and creditors. Reform was seen as necessary to
164There is anecdotal evidence that creditors are prepared to accept PTDs providing for reconveyance
of assets to the debtor following a remortgage which will thereby release equity for distribution to the
PTD creditors.
165It is understood anecdotally that the main credit reference agencies score DAS debtors more
favorably.
166See infra Part IV.B.
167See MODERN APPROACH, supra note 14, § 1.6.
16SB(S)A, 1985, c. 66; Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act, 1993, C. 6.
169Id. § 1.7.
17°Id. § 4.4 .
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strike an appropriate balance between debtor and creditor interests,'?' for
example, in relation to income payments and the treatment of the debtor's
home and other assets and to address problems with access to sequestration.
It was also seen as unfit for purpose because the procedure was perceived to
be unnecessarily cumbersome and in need of streamlining and
modernization.172
PTDs were seen as unfit for purpose .because they were also perceived as
not striking an appropriate balance between debtor and creditor interests,
not least because they offer debt relief with a much "lighter touch" than
sequestration.v'" There were concerns over a perceived lack of proper returns
for creditors.l?" especially in the case of income-only trust deeds.t?> and lack
of regulation.t?"
DAS was seen as unfit for purpose because of its low take-up. Reasons
given for this included lack of capacity in the system because of insufficient
certified money advisers, lack of any automatic debt relief, even in the limited
form of freezing of interest and/or charges, and the availability of income-only
PTDs.177
IV. THE REFORMS
A. ENGLAND AND WALES
1. Addressing the Gap: Separate Provision for NlN.As
The introduction of a moratorium procedure to protect NINA debtors
from harassment was previously contemplatedv" but not implemented. How-
ever, a more radical "bankruptcy lite" scheme for NINA debtors, frozen out
of bankruptcy by the prohibitive filing cost, is being implemented. The
scheme was first vetted in a consultation paper issued by the Department of
i7lId. at v (entitled Ministerial Forward); SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE, MODERNISING BANKRUPTCY AND
DILIGENCE IN SCOTLAND: DRAFT BILL AND CONSULTATION, § 1.1 (2004), available at http://
www.scotland.gov.uk/consultations/justice/cdbdb.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2007)[hereinafter MODERNIS.
ING BANKRUPTCY].
172See MODERN APPROACH, supra note 14, § 1.6.
i73See PROTECTED TRUST DEEDS, supra note 107, §§ 3.1-3.9.
i74See MODERN ApPROACH, supra note 14, §§ 8.5, 8.6; PROTECTED TRUST DEEDS, supra note
107, §§ 3.32, 3.39.
175See PROTECTED TRUST DEEDS, supra note 107, § 4.7.
176See MODERN ApPROACH, supra note 14, § 8,4; MODERNISING BANKRUPTCY, supra note 171; § 6.3;
seealso PROTECTED TRUST DEEDS, supra note 107, §§ 3,43-3.57.
177S ee PROTECTEDTRUST DEEDS, supranote 107, § 3.16; see also ENTERPRISE AND CULTURE COM.
MITTEE, ENTERPRISE AND CULTURE COMMITTEE OFFICIAL REPORT 7 MARCH 2006, 2006-6, available
at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committees/enterprise/or-06/ec06-0602.htm#Co!2713
(last visited Jan. 31, 2007)[hereinafter ECC REPORT-7 MARCH 2006). All ECC reports are available on
the Scottish Parliament website at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committees/enterprise/
meetings.htm.
178See INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 5, § 309.
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Constitutional Affairs ("'DCA"), which expressed the concern that too many
NINA debtors were accessing the unsuitable CCAO procedure.l?? As
CCAOs are not self-financing, the cost of processing NINA debtors through
an unsuitable procedure, with apparently little benefit for them and their
creditors, is subsidized by other court users and taxpayers. The DCA con'
eluded that a self-financing administrative debt relief scheme operated by the
Insolvency Service should be introduced for NINAs with relatively low
levels of debt.180 A court-based scheme was considered inappropriate because
debt relief is outside the dispute resolution and enforcement functions of the
courts and could be delivered better, and more cost-effectively by the Insol-
vency Service.l'"
As a majority of respondents to the consultation indicated that they were
in favor of some form of separate NINA scheme,182 the Insolvency Service
was tasked to produce a more comprehensive proposal, details of which were
subsequently set out in a further consultation.w> The scheme - modeled on
a no asset procedure that is being introduced in New Zealand - is targeted
at NINA debtors who cannot realistically pay even a portion of their
debts.184 NINAs are defined as debtors whose liabilities, both secured and
unsecured, are less than £15,000 and whose net disposable income is no more
than £50 per month after deducting necessary living expenses.r" The inclu-
sion of secured debts in calculating total liabilities would have the effect of
excluding homeowners who have mortgage debts.186 The figure of £50 per
month is the threshold figure that the OR uses as the trigger for income
payments in bankruptcy.l"? Allowable expenses would be calculated in accor-
dance with the Common Financial Statement approved by the British Bank,
179See CHOICE OF PATHS, supra note 145, §§ 24-35.
18°Id. §§ 28-42.
18lId. § 34. Moves are also afoot to remove voluntary bankruptcy petitions from the court system on
similar grounds.
182See DEPT. OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, RESPONSE PAPER ON THE CONSULTATION-'A
CHOICE OF PATHS'-BETTER OPTIONSTO MANAGE OVER-INDEBTEDNESS AND MULTIPLE DEBTCP(R)
23/04, 8 (2005), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/debt/responses.pdf (last visited Jan. 31,
2007).
183See RELIEF FOR THE INDEBTED, supra note 145.
184Id. §§ 5,20,22,31; see also Thomas Telfer, New Zealand Ban~ruptcy Law Reform: The New Roleof
the Official Assignee and the Prospects for a No-Asset Regime in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 10, at 247-68. In New Zealand, the objective is to channel NINAs away from
bankruptcy, which is regarded as an excessively punitive response to the problems of subsistence-level
debtors and welfare recipients. Telfer, supra, at 263-64. By contrast, in England and Wales, the need for
bankruptcy administration to remain self-financing, manifested in the government's refusal to countenance
means-tested exemption from the requirement to pay the OR's deposit, is perhaps the most significant
driver behind establishment of a separate scheme.
185See RELIEF FOR THE INDEBTED, supra note 145, §§ 51-64.
186Id. §§ 51-54.
187Id. § 57.
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ers' Association and the Money Advice Trust, which relies on data from the
family expenditure survey conducted by the Office for National Statistics.l'"
Access to the scheme would also be denied to debtors who have non-exempt
assets worth more than £300.189
Under the scheme, the OR would make a debt relief order (....DRO") stay'
ing individual enforcement and providing for discharge of debts scheduled to
the order after one year."? Applications would be made electronically to
save costs, but would have to be routed through an approved intermediary
drawn from the not-for-profit debt advice sector.'?' A moderate fee in the
region of £100 would be charged to cover administrative costs,192 a signifi-
cant reduction on the costs of filing bankruptcy.
Given the generous nature of the relief, safeguards to protect creditors
and the public are contemplated in addition to the eligibility requirements.
DROs would be entered on the publicly accessible individual insolvency reg'
ister (as are bankruptcies and IVAs).193 The debtor would be subject to the
same legal restrictions as an undischarged bankrupt, including the prohibition
on obtaining credit over a prescribed amount without disclosure.l?' Creditors
would have a right to object on specified grounds which could lead the OR,
after enquiry, to revoke the order.l'" It would be an offence for a debtor to
fail willfully to disclose information about her affairs, especially her assets,
income and liabilities.V" Non-disclosure could also be a ground for revoca-
tion. Any misconduct would also be dealt with through the existing post'
discharge restrictions regime."? It would not be possible for a qualifying
debtor who obtains a DRO to seek a further one within the next six years.198
Finally, mechanisms are proposed for dealing with improvements in the
188THE COMMON FINANCIAL STATEMENT-A PARTNERSHIP ApPROACH TO DEALING WITH DEBT
(2004), available at http://www.bba.org.uk/bba/j8p/polopoly.jsp?d=146&a=729 (last visited Jan. 31,
2007)[hereinafter THE COMMON FINANCIAL STATEMENT]. On current dollar-sterling exchange rates, it
is conceivable that a hypothetical debtor with £50 per month of surplus income who would just qualify
for relief under the proposed scheme would be a presumptive abuser for the purposes of 11 U .S.C.
§ 707(b )(2) by virtue of the $100 current monthly income trigger.
189See RELIEF FORTHE INDEBTED, supra note 145, §§ 65·68. Exempt assets would be the same as for
bankruptcy. Id. § 65.
190Id. §§ 32, 72
191Id. §§ 38.50. The process is therefore similar to the Scottish DAS scheme, albeit DROs would be a
tool of debt relief.
192Id. § 36.
193Id. §§ 74, 89.
194Id. § 88.
195Id. §§ 82.84.
196Id. § 87. Full disclosure of these matters is critical given the eligibility requirements.
197Id. §§ 87, 92·95.
198Id. §§ 91.
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debtor's financial circumstances during the one-year duration of the order.l"?
The response to the proposed scheme was overwhelmingly positive.v? A
Working Group has been formed consisting of representatives from the debt
advice sector to consider further the licensing, resourcing and functions of the
approved intermediary. Draft legislation to establish the scheme is currently
going through Parliament."?'
2. "Consumerizing" [VAs
A Working Group made up of representatives from the IP profession, the
IVA factories and the debt advice sector was set up by the Insolvency Ser-
vice to address the issue of the suitability of the IVA for consumer debtors.
The Group's proposals were put forward in a consultation paper published in
2005. 202 It is perhaps ironic that "consumerizing" IVAs reached the top of
the policy agenda at just the point when the existing procedure has become
the debt relief tool of choice for salaried consumer debtors."> Nevertheless,
the main theme of the paper was the continuing under-utilization of IVAs
relative to DMAs, despite the IVA being "the best product in the market for
both debtors and creditors,"204 because it offers a stay and debt relief within
a finite timescale for the former, and the prospect of a better return than
bankruptcy for the latter. The proposals therefore aim to increase the accessi-
bility of the IVA, with a view to correcting a perceived market failure and to
fulfilling the IVA's potential as an alternative to DMAs and bankruptcy that
balances the interests of debtors and creditors.s?" The chosen vehicle is the
199Id. §§ 90, 93·99. It is contemplated that debtors would be given an opportunity to consider an IVA
or a CCAO, pending revocation of the DRO.
200See INSOLVENCY SERVICE, RELIEF FOR THE INDEBTED-AN ALTERNATIVE TO BANKRUPTCY,
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES AND GOVERNMENT REPLY, §§ 1·15 (2005), available at httpc/z'www.insol-
vency .gov.uklinsolvencyprofessionandlegislationlcon_doc_registerI relieffortheindebtedanalternativeto
bankruptcyresponse.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2007)[hereinafter RELIEP FOR THE INDEBTED·RESPONSES
AND REPLY]. Some in the credit industry appear to have recognized that there is no point incurring
further costs trying to get blood out of a stone.
201See TRIBUNALS, COURTS AND ENFORCEMENT BILL, H.L. Bill 5 06·07 (2006), available at http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/pabills/200607/tribunals_courts_and_enforcement.htm (last visited
Jan. 31, 2007).
202See IMPROVING IVAs, supra note 80.
203See LIVING ON TICK, supra note 60, at 8.
204See IMPROVING IVAs, supra note 80, § 21.
205The Insolvency Service only seeks income payments from bankrupts in roughly 20% of cases (albeit
this represents an increase on historic levels). INSOLVENCY SERVICE, EVALUATION OF CONTRIBUTIONS
FROM INCOME BY BANKRUPTS - SECOND INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT, § 16 (2006), available at
http://www.insolvency.gov.uklinsolvencyprofessionandlegislation/legislationlevaluationlContributionsl
Contributions2.pdf (last visited Jan. 31,2007). We interpret IVA reform as therefore being more about
shifting the market away from DMAs towards IVAs than it is about channeling debtors away from
bankruptcy towards IVAs. IMPROVING IVAs, supranote 80, §§ 21·24. It follows from the Insolvency
Service data on income payments, supra, that many of those who currently file for bankruptcy would not
have sufficient surplus income to support a viable IVA.
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"simple individual voluntary arrangement" ("'SIVA"). As the name suggests,
what is envisaged is a simplified version of the IVA. SIVA would not dis-
place the IVA, which would remain available for business debtors and con-
sumer debtors who fail to satisfy the proposed SIVA eligibility requirements.
The idea is to reduce the fixed costs associated with setting up an IVA
through procedural streamlining and other forms of standardization so as to
create a cost-effective model capable of balancing the interests of debtors and
creditors, while providing sufficient incentives to private sector IPs to oper-
ate it.
SIVA would be open to debtors whose undisputed unsecured debts do
not exceed £75,000.20 6 Access would be barred to anyone whose conduct
would attract post-discharge restrictions in bankruptcy-?? or who had en-
tered a SIVA within the previous six years.20 B The main target group is
consumer debtors in regular employment who have sufficient surplus income
(or income and assets) to pay a higher dividend than would be achieved in
bankruptcy.sv?
The procedure would be vastly simplified. The majority required for ap-
proval would be reduced from its current level (in excess of 75% of creditors
by value) to a simple majority by value.t-? There would be no requirement
for a creditors' meeting and no scope for creditors to propose modifications.
Creditors would vote for or against the proposal in writing within a pre-
scribed period on a "take it or leave it" basis.i!' The emphasis would be on
the nominee to ensure that the best deal is reached using a standard approach
to the assessment of allowable expenses and disposable income.s->
As well as a streamlined procedure, SIVAs would have standard default
206See IMPROVING IVAs, supra note 80, §§ 28·29. The majority of the IV A debtors sampled in
LIVING ON TICK, supra note 60, would have qualified.
207See IMPROVING IVAs, supra note 80, §§ 32, 34. The nominee would effectively act as gatekeeper.
2osId. §§ 33, 35.
209Id. § 28. Homeowners with equity in their homes would be required to contribute something from
the equity. Homeowners who insist on excluding equity from the arrangement would likely be denied
access to a SIVA. Id. §§ 60·64.
21OId. §§ 34, 89·93. This is designed to reduce the influence of creditors who choose not to support
the process or who have unrealistic dividend demands. Id. In the original proposals, an even more radical
scheme for a two-tier SIVA was advanced which contemplated a non-voting procedure for qualifying
debtors whose debts did not exceed £30,000 and a simple majority approval procedure for qualifying
debtors whose debts were between £30,000 and £75,000. Id. §§ 30·33. The non-voting SIVA met with a
cool response from the credit industry and only the simple majority approval SIV A is being taken forward.
See INSOLVENCY SERVICE, IMPROVING INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENTS, SUMMARY OF RE·
SPONSES AND GOVERNMENT REPLY, 5, 9·12 (2006), available at http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insol·
vencyprofessionandlegislation/con_doc_register/improvinglVAsgovtresponse.pdf (last visited Jan. 31,
2007).
21lSee IMPROVING IVAs, supra note 80, §§ 35, 73·77, 84·88.
212Id. §§ 34, 78·83. The approach would be based on THE COMMON FINANCIAL STATEMENT. See
supra note 188.
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features. The default period for a SIVA would be five years.s-> This reflects
the prevalence of five-year IVAs in the existing market place.214 The devel-
opment of an industry-wide best practice model would be encouraged, incor-
porating standard terms and conditions.s-> The cost savings from procedural
streamlining and product standardization should improve access for consumer
debtors who have relatively low debt burdens. IP fees would also be spread
over the life of the arrangement to provide a better balance for creditors,
increasing the likelihood that creditor approval would be forthcoming.v'"
Legislation to bring in the SIVA is anticipated in 2008 although no formal
announcement to that effect has been made.
3. CCAOs/DMAs
It might be thought that the promotion of wider access to formal pay'
ment plans through the development of the SIVA would prompt the aboli-
tion of the discredited CCAO procedure. It has long been recognized that the
CCAO eligibility requirements are a bar to access, and the available evidence
suggests that the main users are people on low incomes with limited means of
repayment many of whom would qualify for relief under the DRO scheme for
NINAs.217 However, the current indications are that CCAOs are to be re'
tained alongside a new out-of-court regulated DMA scheme.
During its consultation on NINAs, the DCA posited a revised CCAO
model with an increased debt ceiling, a fixed duration and under which statu'
tory composition would be available where scheduled repayments were made
but at levels insufficient to meet the debts in full.218 Consultees were asked
to consider whether the model could best be delivered through the court
system or through an out-of-court approved intermediary scheme (similar in
design to the DAS).219 After consultation.P? the DCA is now promoting
three schemes for which provision has been made in draft legislation: (i) a
revised court-based CCAO with a £15,000 debt ceiling, a maximum duration
of five years and with composition to be offered as an incentive to compliance
with the terms of the order; (ii) a parallel out-of-court regulated DMA
2l3See IMPROVING IVAs, supra note 80, §§ 33, 35.
214See LIVING ON TICK, supra note 60, at 23.
215See IMPROVING IVAs, supra note 80, §§ 45·50, 55·59, 65·68.
216Id. §§ 106.24. IPs can currently draw their fees from realizations achieved in the early years of an
IVA. Where the IVA subsequently fails, creditors may receive little or nothing because any realizations
will have been absorbed in costs. Id. § 108.
217See KEMPSON & COLLARD, supra note 77, at 5·20; CHOICE OF PATHS, supra note 145, §§ 30·42.
218See CHOICE OF PATHS, supra note 145, §§ 61·77.
219Id. §§ 58.77-
220See DEPT. OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, RESPONSE PAPER ON THE CONSULTATION-'A
CHOICEOF PATHS'-BETTER OPTIONS TO MANAGE OVER' INDEBTEDNESS AND MULTIPLE DEBT CP(R)
23/04, 3·24 (2005), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/debt/responses.pdf (last visited Jan. 31,
2007).
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scheme with similar features (including composition) to be operated by ap-
proved intermediaries; and (iii) an enforcement restrictions order procedure
simply offering a short-term moratorium on enforcement to debtors whose
difficulties are temporary pending the revival of their fortunes.s-' The vari-
eties of payment plans offering debt relief look set to multiply further.
B. SCOTLAND
The Scottish reforms, like the earlier introduction of the DAS, are part of
a wider Scottish Executive policy of creating a new approach to debt man-
agement and enforcement in Scotland. A brief account of their development is
followed by discussion of the reforms themselves under a number of headings:
(i) reforms parallel to those introduced in England and Wales by the EA
2002 ("EA 2002-style reforms"); (ii) debtor access to sequestration; (iii) other
reforms to sequestration; (iv) reforms to PTDs; and (v) reforms to the DAS.
1. Development of the Reforms
The Scottish Executive began consulting on its proposed reforms in 2003.
It initially sought views on EA 2002-style reforms in Scotland, debtor access
to sequestration, other reforms to sequestration (including the relationship of
sequestration and the DAS), changes to the range of debt management tools,
streamlining of sequestration procedure, reform of PTDs and NINA debt-
ors.2 2 2 Firm proposals on several of these issues were put out for further
consultation in 2004, and the Working Group on Debt Relief was set up to
consider debtor access to sequestration and NINA debtors.s-" The Working
Group's report was published on the Scottish Executive website during 2005
but was not the subject of formal consultation.s>'
The Bankruptcy and Diligence (Scotland) Bill ("'BD(S) Bill") was intro-
duced into the Scottish Parliament on 21 November 2005.225 It included the
EA 2002-style reforms, limited provisions affecting debtor access to seques-
tration, provisions designed to adjust the balance between debtors and credi-
tors and to streamline sequestration procedure as well as provisions for the
reform of PTDs,226 The majority of these provisions were to be contained in
separate regulations, a draft of which was subsequently the subject of a sepa-
rate consultation and a separately issued partial regulatory impact assessment
published in early 2006.227 The Scottish Executive also completed an internal
221See TRIBUNALS, COURTS AND ENFORCEMENT BILL, supra note 201, Part 5.
222See MODERN ApPROACH, supra note 14, at 2-33.
22'See MODERNISING BANKRUPTCY, supra note 171, §§ 7.8-7.10.
224See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 161.
225See BANKRUPTCY AND DILIGENCE ETC. BILL, S.P. Bill 50 06-07 (2006), available at http://www.
scottish.parliament.uk/business/billsl50-bankruptcyDiligencelindex.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
226Id. at Part 1.
227See PROTECTED TRUST DEEDS, supra note 107, Annex B.
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review of the DAS in February 2006, which formed the basis of its advice to
the Scottish Ministers on DAS reform but which was not published or the
subject of formal consultation.
During the legislative process, a number of new provisions were added to
the bankruptcy part of the BD(S) Bill including provisions on NINA access
to sequestration and DAS reform. The Scottish Parliament passed the Bank-
ruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Act, 2007 ("BD(S)A 2007") on 30 No-
vember 2006 and received the Royal Assent on 15 January 2007, but most of
its substantive provisions, including the majority of the bankruptcy reforms,
will come into force on a date or dates to be appointed, probably in late 2007
or early 2008.228
2. The EA ZOOZ-Style Reforms
The BDS(A) 2007 contains reforms which mirror in most respects the
EA 2002 reforms in England and Wales. When it comes into force, the
debtor will be discharged automatically one year after the date of sequestra-
tion unless discharge is deferred by the court.s-? In contrast to England and
Wales, however, there will be no possibility of an earlier discharge unless the
debtor utilizes the composition procedure."? Debtors with sufficient means
will, however, be required to make income contributions for up to three years
from the date of sequestration, and formal provisions on income payment
agreements have been introduced to complement the existing provisions for
court orders."" There will also be a post-discharge restrictions regime,
closely mirroring that introduced in England and Wales, which will be oper-
ated by the AIB.232 As has happened in England and Wales, the legal restric-
tions applicable to undischarged debtors are being cut back233 and the
Scottish Ministers have been given power to make orders repealing, revoking,
amending or modifying other such restrictions where appropriate.s>'
These reforms have a similar business rationale to the parallel reforms
introduced in England and Wales, an additional driver in Scotland being the
need to keep a level playing field between the two jurisdictions.P? However,
22SPor the Bill's progress, see http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/bills/50·bankruptcyDili·
gencelindex.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
229BD(S)A, 2007, asp. 3, § 1.
230B(S)A, 1985, c. 66, § 56, sched. 4. The composition procedure will be simplified as part of the
reforms streamlining the sequestration process. See supra Part lLB.
231BD(S)A, 2007, asp. 3, § 18.
232Id. at asp. 3, § 2.
233Id. at asp. 3, § 3 makes appropriate amendments to lA 1986, c. 45, § 51, which deals with disqualifi-
cation from being appointed as a receiver. BD(S)A, 2007, asp. 3, § 4 also makes amendments to the Local
Government (Scotland) Act, 1973, c. 65, § 31, which deals with disqualification from nomination, election
and holding office as a member of a local authority.
234BD(S)A, 2007, asp. 3, § 5, inserting B(S)A, 1985, c. 66, § 71B.
235TheEnterprise and Culture Committee of the Scottish Parliament, however, took the view that the
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the reforms are not restricted to business debtors but apply equally to con-
sumer debtors and raise the same kinds of issues that have been raised in
England and Wales.2 36
3. Debtor Access to Sequestration
Debtor access to sequestration became a key issue in the context of the
Scottish reforms. The problem of apparent insolvency as a barrier to debtor
access to sequestration had long been recognized-"? and the definition had in
the past been the subject of piecemeal amendment prior to the introduction
of the BD(S) Bill. The BD(S) Bill contained one further amendment which
impacted indirectly on the apparent insolvency requirement but still de-
pended on creditor action as the trigger.2 38 None of these changes addressed
the fundamental issue.
The Working Group on Debt Relief considered the issue of debtor access
to sequestration in the context of access to debt relief generally and for
NINAs in particular. It took account of the DRO proposals in England and
Wales but rejected a separate NINA procedure for Scotland on the basis that
this would add further complexity to the system. It favored a solution based
on widening access to sequestration.P? Despite some concerns with this ap-
proach, in particular the possible unintended economic effects of any sus-
tained rise in sequestrations that might result, the majority of the Working
Group believed it was possible to widen access to sequestration for NINAs
for whom it was appropriate while avoiding a significant rise in sequestra-
impact on levels of entrepreneurial activity or business restarts will be negligible and the desire to create a
level playing field as regards discharge periods across the UK was a more likely reason for the reforms. See
ECC STAGE 1 REPORT, supra note 120, §§ 32-33.
236See ECC REPORT-7MARCH 2006, supranote 177, col. 2173. The Enterprise and Culture Commit-
tee took evidence on the effect of the Enterprise Act reforms south of the border.
237See MODERN ApPROACH, supranote 14, § 6.3 (referring to SCOTTISH OFFICE, THE BANKRUPTCY
(SCOTLAND) ACT 1985, A CONSULTATION FOLLOW-UP: PROTECTED TRUST DEEDS AND OTHER ISSUES
(jul. 1998)[hereinafter JULY 1998 CONSULTATION]). The JULY 1998 CONSULTATION was a follow-up to
an earlier consultation, SCOTTISH OFFICE, ApPARENT INSOLVENCY, A CONSULTATION PAPER ON
AMENDING THE BANKRUPTCY (SCOTLAND) ACT 1985 (lul. 1997). Apparent insolvency is not the only
barrier to debtor access to sequestration. Before a debtor can petition for sequestration without the con-
currence of a qualifying creditor, she must also establish that there has been no award of sequestration in
the preceding five years and that she has the qualifying level of debt, currently £ 1,500. B(S)A, 1985, c. 66,
§ 5(2B)(a). This level will be increased to £3,000. BD(S)A, 2007, asp. 3, § 25.
238The amendment introduced a requirement that enforcement of a summary warrant - a warrant to
do diligence (execution in other jurisdictions) without the need for a judgment on the debt - must be
preceded by service of a "charge to pay" (a form of demand). BD(S)A, 2007, asp. 3, § 195. Non-compliance
with a "charge to pay" constitutes apparent insolvency. B(S)A, 1985, c. 66, § 7(1)(c)(ii). Summary war-
rants may be obtained on application to the sheriff by certain types of creditors only, notably creditors for
rates and taxes. Debtors' (Scotland) Act, 1987, c. 18, §§ 74, 106 and sched. 4. Thus, the amendment may
indirectly extend access to sequestration for rate and tax debtors.
239See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 161, at 22-45.
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tions and any unintended adverse economic consequences.>'?
The Working Group identified two categories of NINAs: "true" NINAs,
who had no reasonable prospect of paying off their debts within a reasonable
time, and temporary NINAs, who had suffered a change of circumstances but
whose position might improve with the result that they could resume repay-
ing their debts,241 The Working Group considered that true NINAs should
obtain immediate access to sequestration, but access to debt relief for tempo-
rary NINAs should be delayed for a period to see whether their position did
improve.s-?
Having considered various possible ways of achieving this, the Working
Group recommended the introduction of a new "single gateway" procedure
designed to give those NINAs for whom sequestration was appropriate an
alternative means of access to it, while also providing a solution for tempo-
rary NINAs.243 It also recommended, inter alia, compulsory referral to inde-
pendent money advice - a form of pre-bankruptcy counseling - for all
debtors seeking sequestration.s--
The Scottish Executive accepted that widening access to sequestration
was the appropriate solution for NINAsbut has not implemented the Work-
ing Group's proposed "single gateway."245 In fact, when it was introduced,
the BD(S) Bill did not contain any NINA provisions. When the issue was
raised in evidence to the Enterprise and Culture Committee of the Scottish
Parliament.>" the Scottish Executive responded that it was still considering
how to address the problem and would introduce appropriate amendments at
a later stage.>? The provisions ultimately enacted will allow a debtor who
satisfies certain conditions to establish that she is unable to pay her debts as
an alternative to establishing that she is apparently insolvent or has granted a
24°Id. at 25-28.
241Id. at 21.
242Id. at 29-37-
243Id. at 38-49. The proposed procedure envisaged an application for debt relief by an approved money
adviser on behalf of the debtor where an independent assessment of the debtor's financial position showed
that there was no suitable alternative procedure such as a PTD or the DAS. Id. at 38-39 This would
result either in an immediate award of sequestration (true NINAs) or a moratorium of up to 12 months
(analogous to the proposed enforcement restrictions order procedure in England and Wales) with provi-
sion for re-assessment at appropriate intervals (temporary NINAs). Id. at 40-41. The moratorium would
be terminated where the debtor ceased to be a NINA. Id. at 41. Where the debtor remained a NINA at
the end of the moratorium, an award of sequestration would then be made. Id.
244Id. at 4, 31-32, 38, 42, 46, 49.
245BD(S)A, 2007, asp. 3, § 15 introduces a new point of access to sequestration but not in the form of
the single gateway.
246See ENTERPRISE AND CULTURE COMMITTEE, ENTERPRISE AND CULTURE COMMITTEE OFFICIAL
REPORT 17 JANUARY 2006, 2006-1 AND 24 JANUARY 2006, 2006-2, available at http://
www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committees/enterprise/2006.htm.
247See ECC REPORT-7 MARCH 2006, supra note 177, cols. 2747-48.
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trust deed which has failed to become protected.>" The conditions are that
her weekly income does not exceed £100, she does not own any land and the
total value of her assets does not exceed £1,000. 2 49 Matters such as how the
debtor's income and the value of her assets are to be determined for this
purpose will be prescribed in regulations."? This is akin to the approach
adopted in England and Wales.
4. Other Reforms to Sequestration
The BOS(A) 2007 contains other reforms to sequestration, including (i)
those designed to adjust the balance between debtors and creditors; and (ii)
those designed to streamline the procedure to improve its efficiency, cost'
effectiveness and user-friendliness. The first group includes the introduction
of time limits for dealing with the debtor's home2 5 1 and for retaining certain
other assets of the debtor within the sequestration.v" These proposed re'
forms shift the balance in favor of the debtor and, as such, may increase the
attractiveness of sequestration as a debt solution for eligible debtors. The
second group includes provision for debtor petitions to be determined admin-
istratively by the AIB rather than the court; consolidation of all other bank,
ruptcy proceedings in the sheriff court (with limited exceptions); the
combining of the roles of interim and permanent trustees in sequestration;
and the streamlining of the procedure for judicial composition.>" These re'
forms address perceived fitness for purpose issues.
5. Reforms to P'fDs
The BOS(A) 2007 itself contains some of the reforms to PTOs and paves
the way for the remainder to be implemented by regulations. As already
noted, a draft of the regulations was the subject of a separate consultation in
early 2006.
The proposed reforms embodied in the draft regulations fell broadly into
two overlapping categories: reforms to the requirements for a trust deed to
become protected and reforms relating to the regulation of PTOs. In relation
to the former, the Scottish Executive proposed the introduction of a formal
statutory requirement for the debtor to be given certain prescribed informa'
248See BD(S)A, 2007, asp. 3, § 15.
249Id. § 15.
25 0Id.
25 1Id. § 19. These reforms provide similar treatment of the bankrupt's home as exists in England and
Wales. lA 1986, c. 45, § 283A.
25 2See BD(S)A, 2007, asp. 3, § 29. This provision is similar to the provision relating to the debtor's
home in so far as it provides for the revesting in the debtor of any non-vested contingent interest which
forms part of the debtor's estate by virtue of B(S)A, 1985, c. 66, § 31(5). However, in this case, revesting
occurs on discharge.
mSee BD(S)A, 2007, asp. 3, §§ 6, 14, 16, 21.
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tion and advice->' and for a PTO to be identified as more appropriate than
either the OAS or sequestration.v" It also proposed that protection should
be formally granted by the AIB as opposed to following automatically from
completion of the necessary formalities.s'" This marks a shift towards greater
administrative and regulatory oversight. In granting protection, the AIB
would have to be satisfied that it was reasonable-"? and that the PTO would
produce a minimum dividend: the suggested level was 30p in the pound, al-
though views were also sought on 20p or 25p in the pound.F" Creditors
would also receive more extensive information, and the trustee would have to
provide a fixed quote for the cost of the work carried out up to the decision
on protection and a costs estimate for the administration of the PTO to cred-
itors and the debtor.P? Where protection was refused, the debtor would be
given a six-week "cooling off' period during which she could cancel the trust
deed.260 It was also proposed that a PTO should provide for the debtor to be
discharged after a maximum of three years.261
On the regulatory side of the equation, it was proposed to introduce a
formal statutory requirement for the trustee to keep certain specified records
and to produce a statement of affairs.262 The trustee would also be obliged to
notify all interested parties of a change of more than a specified percentage in
the projected level of either the trustee's fees and outlays or the dividend to
creditors.ss> The AIB would be given extended powers to audit fees264 and
new powers to give directions to or remove the trustee, to act as trustee and
to revoke the protected status of a PTO.265
The Scottish Executive specifically addressed the issue of the overlap be'
254See PROTECTED TRUST DEEDS, supra note 107, §§ 4.5, 4.6.
255Information and advice requirements are currently governed by professional rules rather than by
statute. SeeSTATEMENT OF INSOLVENCY PRACTICE 3A (SCOTLAND) available at http://www.r3.org.uk/
publications/index.cfm?p=80&s=0&id=245.
256See PROTECTED TRUST DEEDS, supra note 107, § 4.11.
257Id. In determining whether it were reasonable to grant protection, the AIB would have to consider
in particular: whether the debtor would have been able to pay her debts in full without granting a trust
deed; whether it was likely that the court would grant an application for post-discharge restrictions were
the debtor's estate to be sequestrated; whether the projected dividend payable under the PTD would be
higher than that payable on sequestration; and the extent to which the proposed dividend would be
funded by the debtor's income. Id. at Annex B. The last factor reflects the Scottish Executive's concern
about income-only trust deeds given the overlap with DAS. Id. § 4.7.
258See PROTECTED TRUST DEEDS, supra note 107, §§ 4.12-4.22.
259Id. § 4.30.
260Id. § 4.35.
261Id. §§ 4.2304.25.
262Id. §§ 5.2, 5.3.
26'Id. §§ 5.4-5.8. A change in one, of course, may lead to a change in the other.
264See BANKRUPTCY AND DILIGENCE ETC. BILL, supra note 225, cl. 21.
265See PROTECTED TRUST DEEDS, supra note 107, § 5.9. Regarding the AIB acting as trustee, the
Scottish Executive has indicated that it envisages that the AIB would do so only in cases where the
trustee has been removed, but the draft regulations annexed to PROTECTED TRUST DEEDS do not contain
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tween sequestration, PTDs and the DAS, starting from the premise that
"[i]n a properly integrated system there should be no overlap unless it serves
a clear purpose, as in general having two tools doing more or less the same
thing will make the system both harder to understand and less likely to be
fair to either debtors or creditors."266 Having considered the degree of over-
lap between the existing tools in relation to debtor protection, debt relief,
payments from income and payments to creditors, it concluded that: (i) there
was a clear justification for overlap between all three tools in terms of debtor
protectionj-"? (ii) there was justification for a less severe form of debt relief
than sequestration in the form of PTDs, and PTDs should therefore be re-
tained despite the overlap with debt relief in sequestration and, possibly in
the future, with a reformed DAS;268 (iii) there was a clear justification for
overlap between all three tools in terms of the "can pay, should pay" princi-
ple, but the current position with respect to income payments in PTDs could
not be justifiedi-s? and (iv) there was insufficient differentiation between se-
questration and PTDs in terms of the dividends payable to creditors which
could not be justified but could be remedied by the introduction of a mini-
mum dividend.>?" In principle, therefore, the Scottish Executive concluded
that PTDs are a useful tool which has a place in a reformed and integrated
system of debt management and relief, but that reform is required to enable
them to fulfill that role.271
The proposals, particularly the proposal for a minimum dividend, proved
highly controversial.s"- The Enterprise and Culture Committee took the
view that the case for a minimum dividend of 30p in the pound had not been
such limitation. Id. at Annex B. There are obvious conflicts of interests with the AIB acting as trustee
even in such limited cases.
266Id. § 3.12. On the potential disempowering effects of complex choices in the consumer bankruptcy
context, see Models of Consumer Ban~ruptcy, supra note 150, at 277.
267See PROTECTED TRUST DEEDS, supra note 107, § 3.14.
268Id.§§ 3.20, 3.21; see infra Part IV.B.6 for further discussion regarding possible reforms to DAS.
269Id. § 3.26.
270Id. § 3.39.
271Id. § 3.54. The Enterprise and Culture Committee agreed that PTDs should continue to have a
major role and should be simple to access, rigorously monitored and appropriately regulated. ECC STAGE 1
REPORT, supranote 120, at § 71. However, the Committee did not support the minimum dividend propo-
sal. Id.
mSee E. MacLean, The Ban~ruptcy & Diligence (Scotland) Bill - A BattleAhead. RECOVERY, Sum-
mer 2006, at 33, available at http://www.r3.org.uk/uploaded_documents/summer2006.pdf (last visited
Jan. 31, 2007); see also D. Hunter, Changes to Trust Deed legislation will cause misery for thousands,
RECOVERY, Summer 2006, at 40, available at http://www.r3.org.uk/uploaded_documents/sum-
mer2006.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2007). The responses to the consultation are summarized in PROTECTED
TRUST DEEDS - CONSULTATION ON DRAFT REGULATIONS AND PARTIAL REGULATORY IMPACT As.
SESSMENT ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES (june 2006), available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/
1097/0031324.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2007)[hereinafter PROTECTED TRUST DEEDS ANALYSIS OF
RESPONSES].
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made out.273 The Scottish Executive indicated that it would consider how
best to take reform forward in the light of the consultation responses-?" but
has not yet published any revised proposals. It is possible that the price for
abandoning the requirement for a minimum dividend may be a positive ap-
proval process similar to that required for an IVA.
6. Reform of the DAS
Reform of the DAS is the only part of the reform package which has not
been the subject of formal consultation. As already noted, the DAS was re-
garded as in need of reform because of a disappointingly low take-up. The
reasons for this can be identified as: lack of capacity in the system because of
insufficient certified money advisers; lack of any automatic debt relief;and the
availability of income-only PTDsP5 PTD reform has already been discussed,
and it is understood that the issue of lack of capacity is being addressed ad-
ministratively.s'" With regard to debt relief, the Scottish Executive simply
indicated that it was considering the introduction of an element of debt relief
into the DAS on the basis that the system arguably lacked a modest form of
debt relieffalling between the DAS and sequestration/PTDs (such as waiver
of interest or charges after payments from income had been sustained for a
suitable periodj.s?? An amendment to the BD(S) Bill was then introduced.
The provision ultimately enacted is an enabling provision which permits the
Scottish Ministers to make provision in regulations for an element of debt
relief in the DAS.278 The extent of debt relief which might be introduced
under this provision is, however, at present unknown.
V. EVALUATING THE PROPOSED REFORMS
A. ENGLAND AND WALES
1. Scope
The implementation of the DRO scheme for NINAs will address the
main gap in current provision. There is some logic in an initial cap of £15,000,
as it would be aligned with the cap proposed for the CCAO and would
therefore provide a facility for temporary NINAs whose circumstances im-
prove to reach an arrangement with their creditors.s"? While at first sight the
cap looks like a compromise between the money advice agencies and the
27'See ECC STAGE 1 REPORT, supra note 120, § 71.
274See PROTECTED TRUST DEEDS ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES, supra note 272, § 63.
275See ECC REPORT-7 MARCH 2006, supra note 177, cols. 2744-47
276Id.
277See PROTECTED TRUST DEEDS, supra note 107, § 3.16; see also ECC REPORT-7 MARCH 2006,
supra note 177, cols. 2744-47 (providing the Scottish Executive's evidence to the ECC which confirmed
that the DAS review was addressing the issue of whether some element of debt relief was appropriate).
27 8BD(S)A , 2007, asp. 3, § 211.
279See RELIEF FOR THE INDEBTED-RESPONSES AND REPLY, supra note 200, § 63.
514 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 80
credit industry, it probably reflects the profile of NINA debtors that the
policymakers have in mind, namely the unemployed, the long-term sick and
other welfare recipients who have tended to gravitate towards the CCAO.
Whether the scheme will successfully channel NINAs away from unsuit-
able repayment alternatives depends on a range of variables. First, it would
require a joined up approach among the various public, private and voluntary
sector agencies who are involved in the provision of debt advice and/or debt
solutions. It makes sense to locate approved intermediaries within the volun-
tary sector on the reasonable assumption that most NINAs access debt ad-
vice via the Citizens Advice route. However, there may need to be an
effective referral system for NINAs who make initial contact with the court,
an IVA provider or a debt management company. Secondly, it remains to be
seen whether such a scheme could be run cost-effectively on the basis of a fee
in the region of £100 given set-up, training, publicity and ongoing administra-
tion costs as well as the additional burden that would be placed on the al-
ready hard-pressed voluntary sector. There are also concerns about whether
a low-cost, self-financingscheme will be sufficiently robust in terms of screen-
ing and scrutiny to prevent abuse. In this respect, the OR's power of revoca-
tion is crucial.
If all the various reform proposals are implemented, salaried debtors
would be presented with a bewildering array of options. Salaried consumer
debtors with unsecured debts of £15,000 or less could access bankruptcy,
reformed CCAO, regulated or unregulated DMA or SIVA (assuming a satis-
factory dividend could be offered net of costs). Salaried consumer debtors
with unsecured debts of more than £15,000 but less than £75,000 could ac-
cess bankruptcy, SIVA or (possibly) DMA (though a realistic repayment
programme within a reasonable timeframe would depend on income and debt
levels). Regarding the salaried consumer debtors with unsecured debts of
£15,000 or less, it is questionable whether reform of the CCAO is worth
pursuing. If CCAOs were abolished outright, there would still be a range of
options, especially if SIVA could be made cost-effective for debtors in the
£10,000-£15,000 bracket.s''? The likelihood is that the type of debtors who
have tended to use the CCAO could be better accommodated either in bank-
ruptcy or in the proposed NINA scheme.
The SIVA has been identified as the best policy tool for balancing the
interests of salaried debtors and their creditors.s'" However, the question of
whether it is sufficiently differentiated from bankruptcy to make it the appro-
priate solution for debtors remains open. The role of bankruptcy as a debt
28°Below these levels, it may be difficult for providers to cover costs and generate a dividend for
creditors based on realistic payment levels over five years.
281See supra Part IV.A.2.
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relief tool for consumer debtors has not been articulated in policy terms. 282
While there is no doubt that it is an inferior mechanism from the standpoint
of creditors, the differential from a debtor perspective looks quite marginal.
There is a rhetorical insistence from government that bankruptcy is a tough
option. Yet, a salaried debtor with little or no non-exempt assets can obtain a
swift discharge in bankruptcy at the price of three years' worth of income
payments. It is true that an undischarged bankrupt may besubject to greater
legal restrictions and that there is greater publicity than is the case with
SIVA/IVA. Debtors also run the risk of post-discharge restrictions in bank,
ruptcy. However, the credit industry does not treat IVAs any more favora-
bly than bankruptcy for the purposes of lending decisions.s''> The risk of a
debtor being subject to post-discharge restrictions is not high in practice be'
cause of practical limits on the capacity of the Insolvency Service to investi-
gate and process cases with the consequence that resources are carefully
targeted. In any event, SIVA targets precisely those salaried debtors who
would not attract post-discharge restrictions in bankruptcy.w' Essentially,
these debtors have a choice between a five-year payment plan (SIVA/IVA)
and a three-year payment plan (bankruptcy) at the price of the diminishing
legal restrictions on undischarged bankrupts and a higher degree of publicity.
For rational maximizers who can afford the filing fee and who have nothing
to fear from the legal restrictions on undischarged bankrupts (for example,
because they are not, or do not wish to become, company directors or mern-
bers of a profession), bankruptcy is a rational choice.
Of course, consumer debtors do not act in the manner predicted by classi-
cal economic theory. A host of other variables, some of them "fuzzy" and
difficult to quantify, may impact on debtor choice. Despite the loosened re'
striction policy of EA 2002, bankruptcy appears to retain 'considerable
stigma.285 For others, the choice will be influenced by their point of entry
into the debt solutions market and/or by personal factors such as pride or
shame. If a consumer debtor prefers to enter a five-year SIVA rather than
petition for bankruptcy because of perceived stigma and/or personal reasons,
282Ramsay, supra note 28, at 223·25.
283See, e.g., R3 BOOKLET, supra note 56, § 35.
284 See supra Part IV.A.2.
285In a recent survey, over 70% of a sample of debtors gave answers that indicated a continuing
perception of stigma attaching to bankruptcy. JOHN TRIBE, CENTRE FOR INSOLVENCY LAW AND POLICY,
BANKRUPTCY COURTS SURVEY 2005-A PILOT STUDY, 104·107 (2006), available at http://www.insol·
vency .gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionalandlegislation/research/personaldocs/BankruptcyCourtsSurvey.pdf
(last visited Jan. 31, 2007); see also INSOLVENCY SERVICE, ATTITUDES TO BANKRUPTCY, available at
http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/policychange/attitudes/report-atti-
tudestobankruptcy.pdf (last visited Jan. 31,2007) (reporting on four surveys of various groups, including a
sample of bankrupts, which identified similar perceptions based, among other things, on the publicity given
to bankruptcy orders through advertisement and the signal that bankruptcy sends about debtors' inability
to meet their obligations).
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there is no problem per se. However, where the choice between bankruptcy
and SIVA is finely balanced (as it may be in the case of salaried debtors with
no assets), the system needs to ensure that consumer debtors are properly
advised on all the options available to them in their particular circumstances.
Given the overlap between bankruptcy and SIVA, regulatory and ethical
concerns still arise.286 The simple truth is that the IP profession, the IV A
factories and private sector DMA providers have no economic stake in bank-
ruptcy as a debt solution for consumer debtors. No asset bankruptcies are
dealt with exclusively by the OR. The potential for conflicts of interest is
obvious.ss? These concerns will be reinforced as the complexity of the system
increases further with the implementation of the CCAO and regulated
DMA reforms. On the other hand, plenty of consumer debtors are accessing
bankruptcy.v" so the problem should not be exaggerated. Nevertheless, the
capacity of an increasingly complex system to deliver appropriate advice for
salaried debtors remains a pressing issue. There are related issues concerning
whether the various agencies involved in the provision of debt advice and
debt solutions are sufficiently coordinated and whether key players, such as
the voluntary sector and the Insolvency Service, are adequately resourced to
meet demand.
2. Suitability
Bankruptcy, SIVA, reformed CCAOs and regulated DMAs all offer debt
relief options appropriate for salaried consumer debtors with limited assets
and stable income. For salaried debtors, especially those with relatively low
levels of indebtedness who have assets, reformed CCAO and DMAs (regu-
lated or unregulated) provide repayment options in which assets can be shel-
tered. SIVAs offer a useful alternative for salaried debtors who want the
discipline of a payment plan but for whom full repayment through a DMA of
maximum five years' duration would not be possible.
The DRO scheme would plug the gap in the current provision. It offers a
cheap bankruptcy equivalent for debtors who cannot afford to file for full
bankruptcy. Without it, the system discriminates in favor of debtors who
have some ability to pay by offering them a debt relief option that is not open
to NINAs. Clearly, the system would provide a route out of indebtedness for
the poorest debtors, and to that extent it may be judged both suitable and
appropriate. In terms of design and implementation, the principal concern is
286See supra Part m.A.I.
287See 2005 INSOLVENCY PRACTICES COUNCIL ANN. REP. 3,6·7, available at http://www.insolvency
practices.org.uk/reportsI2005/annual_report.htm (last visited Jan. 31,2007) (raising concern of potential
for conflicts of interest). The IPC was established in 2000 to represent the public interest in relation to
the regulatory, ethical and professional standards of IPs. See http://www.insolvencypractices.org.uk/
pages/about.htm (last visited Jan. 31,2007).
288See TRIBE, supra note 285, at 29·34.
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whether such a low-cost scheme will be sufficiently robust to exclude debtors
for whom it is not intended and to ensure that temporary NINAs are chan-
neled into repayment alternatives. Indeed, temporary NINAs, as distinct
from true NINAs, pose a problem for policymakers who will not be thanked
if the scheme provides a full discharge for debtors whose circumstances
shortly after the expiry of the twelve-month period are such that they would
no longer be classified as NINAs. This begs the question of whether tempo-
rary NINAs should be denied access and channeled into the proposed en-
forcement restrictions prccedure.s''? It may be that, in practice, approved
intermediaries will be encouraged to channel temporary NINAs into enforce-
ment restrictions as a holding measure. It remains to be seen how well the
ORO scheme will be ring-fenced to maintain the integrity of the underlying
"can pay, should pay" principle.
Another possible concern is that NINAs admitted to the scheme may
have limited incentives to improve their fortunes during the twelve-month
period for fear that they would. lose eligibility and be forced to switch to
some form of repayment option. This may be thought to cut against the grain
of social norms of individual responsibility and self-help. If, however, in prac-
tice, the scheme would be reserved via the screening process to true NINAs,
this concern may be exaggerated. In any event, similar incentives operate in
bankruptcy because the OR or trustee cannot seek income payments after
discharge. Thus, a debtor who has insufficient surplus income to warrant
income payments at the commencement of bankruptcy may have little incen-
tive to increase her income until after she has received her discharge.
B. SCOTLAND
1. Scope
It is more difficult to evaluate the overall effect of the Scottish reforms.
Several key elements of the reform package are still missing, in particular the
detailed regulations on aspects of the NINA provisions, the bulk of the PTO
reforms and the extent of any debt relief to be introduced into the OAS.
The NINA problem has been addressed to the extent that debtors satis-
fying the conditions set out in the legislation will be able to access debt relief
through sequestration. However, the provisions fail to distinguish between
true and temporary NINAs or to provide a solution other than sequestration
for the latter. It also remains to be seen whether the entry thresholds have
been set at an appropriate level to meet the needs of the current (and future)
NINA pool. Much may depend on how these are fleshed out in the
regulations.
The ultimate form of the PTO reforms is not yet known. It is worth
2S9See supra Part IV.B.3 (setting forth the views of the Working Group on Debt Relief in Scotland).
518 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 80
noting, however, that the original proposals raised the prospect of the crea-
tion of a new pool of debtors who would no longer be able to access PTDs
because they could not meet the minimum dividend. Even if the minimum
dividend is abandoned, it is probable that the reforms will still result in a
reduction in the number of debtors able to access PTDs. The Scottish Execu-
tive recognized this potential effect in relation to its original proposals.e?? but
suggested that debtors who could no longer access a PTD and were not in a
position to pay anything to their creditors would be able to petition for se'
questration, while debtors who could no longer access a PTD but who could
pay something to their creditors would be able to enter the DAS.291 Given
the new provisions on access to sequestration, NINA debtors cut off from
PTDs may be able to apply for sequestration instead, but appropriate care
will be required to ensure that the two sets of provisions dovetail so that all
debtors cut off from PTDs do have this (or some other suitable) option. It
should also be noted that, since any element of debt relief introduced into the
DAS is likely to be less than that available in a PTD, any "can pay" debtors
cut off from PTDs who enter the DAS will obtain a lesser degree of debt
relief. This, however, may be seen as justifiable on policy grounds.
The introduction of an element of debt relief into the DAS will result in
three tools offering debt relief of varying degrees. The Scottish Executive did
not perceive this to be an issue on the basis that the DAS will remain signifi-
cantly different from other available forms of debt relief,292 but this may de'
pend on the extent of the debt relief introduced.
The overall effect of the reform package seems (potentially) to narrow
access to PTDs while increasing access to sequestration and the DAS.293 It is
still not clear, however, that all existing and potential new gaps will be ade-
quately closed, and there is still the potential for overlaps. Debtors may in
some cases have less choice, but could still have difficult choices to make. For
example, a debtor who is eligible for a PTD and sequestration may still prefer
the former because it will probably remain a "lighter touch" than sequestra,
tion, but the latter will result in a quicker discharge. Either will be more
attractive than the DAS in terms of debt relief but less attractive in terms of
formality and consequences. A debtor with income who is not eligible for a
PTD but has a choice of sequestration (assuming eligibility) or the DAS will
have similar issues to consider. The attractiveness of the DAS where there is
a choice may come down to the extent of the debt relief introduced, but it
will remain a good option for debtors with income and assets who wish to
290See PROTECTED TRUST DEEDS, supra note 107, § 3.41.
29 1Id. § 3.42.
292Id. § 3.17.
29 3Even under any revised PTD reforms, it would appear likely that access to PTDs would still be
narrowed, albeit perhaps not as much as under the original reforms.
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avoid realizing (all of) their assets. The issue of appropriate advice will there-
fore remain critical.
2. SUitability
Some doubt whether the introduction of EA 2002-style reforms in Scot-
land will achieve their intended purpose of fostering entrepreneurship, not-
withstanding that the evidence given to the Enterprise and Culture
Committee on the operation of the EA 2002 in England and Wales was
positive.w' Furthermore, the suitability of a reformed procedure tailored to
(the minority of) business debtors for (the majority of) consumer debtors may
be questioned.
Any reform of the regulatory aspects of PTDs may increase public confi-
dence and to that extent strengthen their role in the reformed system. On the
other hand, it is likely that their availability for many consumer debtors will
be restricted. This would only be a significant problem, however, if such
debtors did not have access to a suitable alternative option.
The introduction of debt relief into the DAS raises the issue of whether
it achieves an appropriate balance between debtor and creditor interests if
debtors are able to obtain an element of debt relief in a procedure which does
not automatically include assets. The greater the element of debt relief in-
volved, the more problematic this issue becomes. One way around the prob-
lem would be to offer debt relief in the DAS only to debtors who have no
assets or who, if they have assets, agree to include a suitable proportion of
them in the DAS.
CONCLUSION
It is clear from the foregoing that strides are being made towards the
development of comprehensive consumer bankruptcy systems in Britain. In
England and Wales, the outstanding issues are issues of scope concerning the
relationship between the various overlapping debt relief options (bankruptcy,
SIVA/IVA, reformed CCAO, regulated DMA). The byzantine complexity
of this emerging system also raises related issues about the capacity of the
accompanying infrastructure to deliver appropriate advice and channel debt-
ors towards an appropriate solution. The key will be to ensure that the infra-
structure is sufficiently joined up and robust to enable debtors (especially
salaried debtors) to navigate the system and to make what may be quite
difficult choices.
In Scotland, there are also still outstanding issues of scope. It is not yet
clear that all gaps in the system will be closed by the reforms. While the
reformed system will be less complex and offer less choice than the reformed
294See ECC REPORT·7 MARCH 2006, supra note 177, at cols. 2715·36.
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system in England and Wales, there will still be overlaps and the same issues
concerning the capacity to deliver appropriate advice. There are also resourc-
ing issues relating to the AIB, who will have a hugely increased role across all
the options, and outstanding issues of suitability in relation to a reformed
sequestration process tailored for business debtors, but utilized mainly by
consumers, and the extent of debt relief to be introduced into the DAS with-
out any contribution from assets.
Despite some differences in approach which are attributable to the fact
that the two jurisdictions have separate legislative competency for personal
insolvency matters, some common themes can be identified. First, considera-
ble attention is being focused on how to accommodate NINA debtors. Sec-
ondly - and somewhat incongruously - both jurisdictions have committed
to reforms that seek to customize bankruptcy and sequestration as "fresh
start" regimes for failed entrepreneurs. Given that the main users of these
regimes are consumer debtors, the emphasis on business debtors seems mis-
placed.s'" Regarding consumer debtors, most of the emphasis has been on the
provision of "consumer-friendly" alternatives to bankruptcy and sequestration
(DAS, SIVA, reformed PTD, reformed CCAO, regulated DMA). Finally,
both jurisdictions place limited emphasis on the educative potential of insol-
vency processes beyond the salutary impact of the processes themselves. The
possibility of North American-style compulsory debtor counseling and educa-
tion programs has been floated in both jurisdictions, most recently by the
Working Group on Debt Relief in Scotland,296 but generally such initiatives
have met with little enthusiasm. Instead, there is a much greater emphasis on
improving financial awareness and budgeting skills within the general popula-
tion as an ex ante measure falling within the statutory remit of the UK's
principal financial regulator, the Financial Services Authority. Nevertheless,
as we have seen, there is also a growing emphasis on schemes (such as DAS
and NINA) involving approved intermediaries who may perform de facto ed-
ucative functions. This, in turn, may lead to the increasing formalization of
the role of the voluntary sector in the provision of debt advice.
There are thus patterns of divergence and convergence within the emerg-
ing systems which reflect the constitutional relationship between the two
jurisdictions as well as their geographical proximity. The potential, given dev-
29 5M uch of the initial impetus behind the EA 2002 reforms derived from the view that British culture
is not as tolerant of business failure as the prevailing culture in the United States and that this has a
chilling effect on the willingness of our citizens to take business risks. See Waiters, supra note 28, at 65-8.
It is ironic that the US "fresh start" policy was seen as an inspiration for business-oriented bankruptcy
reform in the United Kingdom at a point in the 1990s when it was already obvious that, in practice,
Chapter 7 was a consumer remedy! The subsequent tightening of the US "fresh start" policy brought
about by the 2005 reforms only adds to the sense of irony.
29 6See supra Part rv.B.
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olution, for policymakers north and south of the border to experiment with
different models, while learning from each other, is obvious. It remains to be
seen what will emerge from that process and how the proposed reforms will
work in practice.
GLOSSARY
AIB: Accountant in Bankruptcy (Scotland).
BD(S) Bill: Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Bill, 2006, S.P. Bill
5006,07.
BD(S)A 2007: Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Act, 2007, asp.
3.
B(S)A 1985: Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act, 1985, c. 66.
CCAO: A county court administration order under Part VI of the
County Courts Act 1984, c. 28 (England and Wales).
DAS: The debt arrangement scheme established by Part I of the Debt
Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Act, 2002, asp. 17.
DCA: Department of Constitutional Affairs.
DMA: An unregulated debt management arrangement (England and
Wales).
DPP: A debt payment programme entered into under the DAS.
DRO: Debt relief order.
EA 2002: Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40 (England and Wales).
lA 1986: Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45.
IP: Licensed insolvency practitioner.
IVA: An individual voluntary arrangement under Part VIII of lA
1986.
NINAs/NINA debtors: Debtors with no assets and no disposable
Income.
OR: Official Receiver.
PTD: A protected trust deed under B(S)A 1985.
SIVA: Simple individual voluntary arrangement.
